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WIMBERLY AND BEYOND: ANALYZING THE
REFUSAL TO AWARD UNEMPLOYMENT




In Wimberly v. Labor & Industrial Relations Commission, the Supreme Court inter-
preted section 3304(a)(12) of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), which re-
quires that states not deny unemployment benefits "solely on the basis of pregnancy, "
as an antidiscrimination statute, rather than one requiring preferential treatment for
pregnant and formerly pregnant women. Professor Mary Radford argues that given
the ambiguous legislative history and other Supreme Court precedent in the area of
unemployment compensation, Wimberly couldjust as easily have held that FUTA's
language requires preferential treatment to pregnant and formerly pregnant women.
She further argues that given the current realities that women with children are a
major component of the workforce and that women generally have no guarantee ofjob
reinstatement when they try to return to work, women should not be disqualified from
receiving unemployment benefits, nor should they be presumed ineligible for benefits
merely because they were or currently are pregnant. Disqualifying pregnant or for-
merly pregnant women from receiving unemployment benefits, or presuming them in-
eligible for such benefits, forces them to make the difflcult decision between having
income and having children. Professor Radford concludes that pregnant and formerly
pregnant women should be granted special treatment in the context of unemployment
benefits.
INTRODUCTION
On January 21, 1987, the Supreme Court of the United States
handed down its decision in Wimberly v. Labor & Industrial Relations
Commission.' The Court held that the refusal to award unemployment
compensation to a woman who terminated employment due to preg-
nancy did not violate the prohibition on denial of unemployment benefits
"solely on the basis of pregnancy" found in the Federal Unemployment
Tax Act (FUTA) at section 3304(a)(12). 2 The claimant in Wimberly, a
Missouri resident, took a leave of absence in order to give birth to her
child.3 Upon becoming physically able to work again, she was informed
that her former job was no longer available, and she was unable to find
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. B.A., 1974, New-
comb College of Tulane University; J.D., 1981, Emory University. The Author expresses her
thanks to Linda Birchall for her research and editorial assistance.
1 479 U.S. 511 (1987).
2 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) (1982).
3 Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 512.
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other employment.4 She was denied unemployment benefits because she
had left her prior job due to pregnancy, and not, as required by the Mis-
souri statute, for a cause directly attributable to her employer.5 The
claimant argued that the denial violated FUTA section 3304(a)(12), a
provision the states must comply with in order for employers within the
state to receive tax credits under the federal unemployment compensa-
tion system. 6 Ms. Wimberly claimed that she was denied benefits "solely
on the basis of" her pregnancy.7 The United States Supreme Court in-
terpreted FUTA section 3304(a)(12) as a nondiscrimination statute,
prohibiting any treatment of pregnant women that is different from the
treatment of other persons similarly situated, but not mandating prefer-
ential treatment for such women." The Court found that the claimant
was treated under the Missouri law in the same manner as other persons
who terminated employment for non-work-related causes and thus was
properly disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits.9
This interpretation of FUTA section 3304(a)(12) reflected the
Supreme Court's decision in California Federal Savings & Loan Associa-
tion v. Guerra,10 announced a week prior to Wimberly, in which the
Court construed another statute concerning pregnancy. Guerra involved
a challenge to a California statute mandating maternity leave with a
guarantee of job reinstatement at the end of the leave. Opponents of the
statute claimed that it was pre-empted by Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,11 as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
(PDA),1 2 since the California statute mandated preferential treatment for
women while Title VII and the PDA mandate the equal treatment of
men and women. 13 The Supreme Court agreed that the PDA was a non-
discrimination statute, not a statute providing for the special treatment of
pregnant women, but held that the PDA did not pre-empt state statutes
which provide preferential treatment for pregnant women.14
These two cases focused renewed attention on the national debate
concerning the treatment of pregnant women in the workforce. People
on both sides of this debate agree that the ultimate goal of any preg-
4 Id.
5 Id. Under the applicable Missouri unemployment compensation statute, a worker who
leaves employment voluntarily, without a good cause directly attributable to the employer, is
disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 288.050.1 (1986).
6 26 U.S.C. § 3302(a) (1982).
7 Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 514.
8 Id. at 522.
9 Id.
10 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
12 Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)).
13 Guerra, 479 U.S. at 279.
14 Id. at 292.
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nancy-related policy is the equalization of the participation and competi-
tive ability of women in the workforce.15 However, they disagree as to
the means which should be used to attain this end. "Equal treatment"
proponents assert that pregnant workers should be treated in the same
manner as other disabled workers, in an attempt to shatter preconceived
stereotypes of women as bound to the home and to encourage employers
to consider women as "normal" workforce participants, rather than par-
ticipants who require preferential treatment.' 6 Proponents of the "spe-
cial treatment" approach, on the other hand, argue that certain real
differences between the sexes, particularly those related to the reproduc-
tive function, must be accommodated in the workforce in order to enable
women eventually to compete equally with men.1 7 In this context, it can
be said that Wimberly underlined the notion of equal treatment under
federal statutes, while Guerra, although affirming an equal treatment in-
terpretation of the PDA, permitted states to follow the route of special
treatment.
Wimberly must be examined within both the context of the national
debate on pregnancy issues and the context of the American unemploy-
ment compensation system and its treatment of pregnant workers. The
unemployment system contemplates an interaction between federal and
state statutes, rules, and agency rulings. Part I of this Article introduces
the statutory framework within which this system operates. This Part
also contains an extensive overview of state court interpretations of un-
employment statutes dealing with the granting or denial of benefits to
pregnant and formerly pregnant women.1 8 Included in this overview are
discussions of two pivotal cases that preceded Wimberly and contributed
to the development of both statutory and case law in this area. In the
first of these cases, Turner v. Department of Employment Security,'9 the
United States Supreme Court struck down a Utah unemployment statute
that contained a blanket disqualification from the receipt of unemploy-
ment benefits for a period surrounding the date of childbirth. This case
came before, but was closely aligned with, the enactment of FUTA sec-
15 See notes 521-22 and accompanying text infra.
16 See text accompanying notes 524-30 infra.
17 See text accompanying notes 531-36 infra.
18 As many of those cases deal with attempts by women to return to work after childbirth,
the description "pregnant and formerly pregnant women" will be used in this Article to de-
scribe that class of women who are denied unemployment compensation either during preg-
nancy (when they are still physically able to work but unable to find employment) or after
childbirth or some other termination of pregnancy (when they are again available to work).
This Article does not address the question of whether women should receive some type of
compensation during the time when they are actually physically disabled due to pregnancy or
childbirth; that question relates more to medical and disability insurance mechanisms than to
unemployment compensation.
19 423 U.S. 44 (1975).
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tion 3304(a)(12). In the second case, Brown v. Porcher,20 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that a South Caro-
lina statute, construed to disqualify pregnant women from the receipt of
unemployment benefits because they had left their most recent work vol-
untarily and without "good cause," violated FUTA section 3304(a)(12)
since it resulted in the denial of benefits solely on the basis of the claim-
ant's pregnancy. This statute is of the same type as that upheld by the
United States Supreme Court in Wimberly.
Part II of this Article contains a detailed examination of the Court's
reasoning in Wimberly, as well as an examination of an alternative
scheme of reasoning that would have resulted in a holding similar to that
of Brown v. Porcher. Part III discusses the Wimberly case in the context
of the equal treatment/special treatment debate surrounding legislation
pertaining to pregnant workers. After analyzing Wimberly in light of
both sides of the debate, it concludes that, absent immediate restructur-
ing of the workforce to reflect the ideals of the equal treatment propo-
nents, the benefits of equal treatment are outweighed by the potential
social and financial costs of not giving special accommodation to preg-
nant and formerly pregnant women in the unemployment context.
I
THE BACKGROUND OF WIMBERLY
The American unemployment compensation system has been in
existence since 1935.21 As the system itself is governed by both federal
and state laws, its evolution has taken place on a variety of statutory,
judicial, and administrative levels. This Part briefly describes the statu-
tory framework of the unemployment compensation system and then ex-
amines in detail those judicial and administrative developments
pertaining to the treatment of pregnant and formerly pregnant workers
within the system.
A. Statutory Framework- Federal and State Laws Relating to
Unemployment Compensation
The unemployment compensation system in the United States has
been referred to as "an historical product rather than a logical concep-
tion."22 Some states began discussing the enactment of unemployment
20 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983).
21 See Witte, Development of Unemployment Compensation, 55 Yale L.J. 21, 31-32
(1945).
22 Id. at 21. Edwin Witte's article contains an excellent discussion of the history of the
unemployment compensation system in the United States. The author served as Executive
Director of the Committee on Economic Security, created in 1934 by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt to make recommendations concerning the entire social security system. See T. Bro-
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compensation legislation as early as 1916, following the country's eco-
nomic depression of 1914-1915.23 The depression of the early 1920s fo-
cused national attention on unemployment, but the idea of
unemployment insurance did not become popular until the beginning of
the Great Depression in the early 1930s. 24 During this period, a variety
of federal and state commissions were created for the purpose of studying
and making recommendations regarding unemployment insurance.25
The Democratic national platform upon which Franklin D. Roosevelt
was elected stressed "unemployment insurance through state action."'26
By 1933, as many as sixty-eight bills relating to unemployment insurance
had been introduced in twenty-five states.27 However, when none of
these bills were enacted into law,2 8 it became apparent to Congress that
federal legislation would be necessary to induce states to set up systems
of unemployment compensation.2 9 Thus, within the broader context of
the Social Security Act of 1935,30 Congress enacted the federal frame-
work for the unemployment compensation system.
The bulk of federal legislation relating to unemployment compensa-
tion is now codified in chapter 23 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986.31 This chapter is referred to as the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act (FUTA).32 FUTA contemplates an interaction between the federal
and state governments in the operation of the unemployment compensa-
den, Law of Social Security and Unemployment Insurance § 1.01, at 2 (1962).
23 Witte, supra note 21, at 22-23. American academics had begun discussion of the unem-
ployment insurance issue as early as 1907. Id. at 22. Great Britain passed a national unem-
ployment act in 1911. Id. The first legislative proposal for unemployment insurance in the
United States was introduced in Massachusetts in 1916; it was virtually identical to the British
act. Id. at 23.
24 See id. at 23-25.
25 Id. at 26-27.
26 Id. at 27.
27 Id.
28 Id. Although a variety of reasons were voiced to explain the reluctance of states to pass
these laws, the overwhelming factor leading to their defeat seemed to be the fear that a state
that enacted such a law would hamper the competitiveness of its employers by burdening them
with costs that employers in other states would not have to bear. Id. at 28; see also Hight,
Unemployment Insurance: Changes in the Federal-State Balance, 59 J. Urb. L. 615 (1982)
(discussing federal-state relationship with regard to unemployment insurance laws).
29 See Witte, supra note 21, at 28-29.
30 Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620. For a brief history of the events leading up to the
enactment of the Social Security Act of 1935, see T. Broden, supra note 22, §§ 1.01-.05.
31 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1982). The taxing provisions of Title IX of the Social Security
Act were transferred to the Internal Revenue Code in 1939. Pub. L. No. 76-379, 53 Stat. 1381
(1939). Other provisions relating to unemployment compensation appear in the Social Secu-
rity Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397(f) (1982), principally at subchapter III, 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504
(grants to states for unemployment compensation administration) and subchapter IX, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1108 (provisions relating to Federal Unemployment Trust Fund).
32 26 U.S.C. § 3311 (1982). Chapter 23 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, which
contains the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, is found at 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1982).
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tion system. FUTA initially imposes a tax on all employers. 33 The Act
then grants a credit against the tax for certain contributions paid by an
employer into an unemployment fund maintained under a state unem-
ployment compensation law, provided that the state scheme has been cer-
tified by the Secretary of Labor.34 FUTA also allows an employer an
additional credit for any reduction in contributions permitted by a state's
"experience rating system," a system that reduces contributions based on
an employer's past experience with unemployment.35
Under this system, consequently, an employer must be concerned
with the payment of two "taxes"-one to the federal government and
one to the appropriate state. The current federal tax rate is 6.2% of the
wages paid by an employer. 36 However, due to the application of the
state credits, few employers pay the full federal rate. Credits for pay-
ments under state law are limited to 90% of the federal tax.37 As FUTA
makes no provision for the actual payment of unemployment benefits to
claimants, the federal taxes are used primarily for the administration of
the federal unemployment system. In this way, FUTA delegates to the
states the basic task of setting up and operating unemployment compen-
sation systems. 38
33 26 U.S.C. § 3301 (Supp. II 1984). For purposes of FUTA, the term "employer" in-
cludes any employer who during any calendar quarter in the current or preceeding calendar
paid wages of $1,500 or more, or any employer who employed at least one individual in em-
ployment for 20 weeks (at least part of one day per week) during a calendar year. 26 U.S.C.
§ 3306(a) (1982).
34 26 U.S.C. § 3302(a)(1) (1982).
35 Id. § 3303(a)(1). All states have some form of reduction in an employer's contributions
based on that employer's experience with unemployment. There are basically four "experience
rating" systems under which a state may operate: the reserve-ratio system, the benefit-ratio
system, the benefit-wage-ratio system, and the payroll variation formula. These systems
are discussed in detail at 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 1120 (Feb. 13, 1986). See generally
Arnold, Experience Rating, 55 Yale L.J. 218 (1945) (discussing history, objectives, and differ-
ent methods of experience rating); Schmidt, Experience Rating and Unemployment Compen-
sation, 55 Yale L.J. 242 (1945) (weighing advantages and disadvantages of experience rating);
Wagman, The Mythology of Experience Rating in Unemployment Compensation, 59 J. Urb.
L. 631 (1982) (tracing evolution of experience rating principles through review of factors used
in various state systems).
36 26 U.S.C. § 3301(1) (Supp. 11 1984). The rate is 6.0% for employment that began prior
to 1976. Id. § 3301(2).
37 26 U.S.C. § 3302(c) (1982).
38 Wisconsin was the only state that actually had an unemployment compensation system
in place prior to the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935. Witte, supra note 21, at 26-27.
However, motivated by the 90% tax credit and the fact that federal law made no provision for
the payment of benefits, every state enacted an unemployment compensation law by 1937. Id.
at 34. Many of these states chose to enact laws which mirrored a draft bill issued by the Social
Security Board. Id. at 33-34. Consequently, similar language and structure appear in the laws
of these states. See Harrison, Eligibility and Disqualification for Benefits-Forenote: Statutory
Purpose and "Involuntary Unemployment," 55 Yale L.J. 117, 118 (1945); Witte, supra note
21, at 34. See generally Hight, supra note 28 (discussing federal-state relationship in unem-
ployment insurance).
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Certification of a state's system by the United States Department of
Labor is dependent upon the state's unemployment compensation law
meeting a number of requirements set out in FUTA.39 In particular,
FUTA requires that "no person shall be denied compensation under such
State law solely on the basis of pregnancy or termination of
pregnancy." 40
While, as noted above, FUTA requires a payment of taxes by em-
ployers to the federal government, subject to the state credits, 41 it is
through the state rather than the federal government that unemployment
compensation is paid to individuals. In order to receive unemployment
benefits, an individual must, under the appropriate state law, either have
earned a specified amount of wages or have worked for a certain time, or
both, in a period prior to the time of payment.42 This initial qualifying
period is often referred to as the base period.43
All states have provisions relating to the "eligibility" of a claimant
for unemployment benefits and to "disqualifications" resulting in the de-
nial or deferral of benefits.44 In addition to requiring registration with
39 These requirements are found at 26 U.S.C. § 3304 (Supp. 11 1984). These provisions
require, for instance, that compensation not be denied any individual who is in job training
with the approval of the appropriate state agency, 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(8) (1982), that compen-
sation not be paid to instructional, research, and administrative personnel in an educational
institution during the period between two successive academic years if such individuals are
reasonably assured of a job with the institution in the following year, id. § 3304(a)(6), and that
athletes not be paid unemployment compensation between two successive sport seasons if there
is reasonable assurance that the athletes will perform in the later season. Id. § 3304(a)(13).
40 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) (1982).
41 See text accompanying notes 33-38 supra.
42 See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 46-110(2) (1987).
43 The base period is typically the first four of the five quarters preceding the quarter in
which the claim for unemployment benefits is made. The amount of the benefit paid is usually
based upon the average wages earned by the claimant in all or some portion (such as the
quarter in which highest wages were earned) of the base period. See IB Unempl. Ins. Rep.
(CCH) 1901 (Mar. 4, 1986).
44 See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 46-110 (1987) (eligibility); id. § 46-111 (disqualification).
In this context, courts often use the terms "ineligible" and "disqualified" interchangeably. For
purposes of this Article, the term "eligibility" and related terms shall refer to those positive
criteria relating to the claimant's readiness to re-enter the workforce that are required as a
condition of receiving benefits, such as the ability to work and availability for work. The term
"disqualification" and related terms shall refer to those situations where the circumstances
surrounding an employee's termination of his or her prior employment-for misconduct, for
example-result in the denial of benefits.
Eligibility questions-those related to an individual's ability to and availability for
work-are most logically associated with the periods of pregnancy or recuperation immedi-
ately thereafter. Disqualification questions-those related to an individual's reasons for leav-
ing work-can be relevant during those same periods, but also arise when a formerly pregnant
woman applies for and is refused reinstatement to her old position. The period for which
benefits are sought is an alternate way to categorize the cases examined in this Article, see
Annotation, Termination of Employment Because of Pregnancy as Affecting Right to Unem-
ployment Compensation, 51 A.L.R.3d 254 (1973), but it is not the route taken here. This
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the appropriate state unemployment agency, state laws generally require
that, in order to be eligible to receive benefits, an individual must be cur-
rently "able to work" and "available for work."' 45 A claimant is typically
not considered "available for work" unless that individual has been and
is "actively and earnestly seeking work," 46 and thus "is bona fide in the
labor market."'4 7 The latter concept, often referred to as "labor market
attachment, '48 reflects the theory that the American unemployment in-
surance system is "a restricted system whose object is to provide pay-
ments based upon past earnings to a carefully selected group of workers
for a limited period during occasional lay-offs," 49 as opposed to a system
providing "the major protection against income loss due to unemploy-
ment, covering all or almost all workers and paying, for a significant
period of time, benefits that for the vast majority are sufficient to cover
subsistence without resort to supplementary public aids."'50 In short, the
eligibility requirements are satisfied "when an individual is willing, able,
and ready to accept suitable work which he does not have good cause to
refuse." 51
States also have a variety of provisions which disqualify an individ-
ual who has left work "voluntarily" without "good cause" or without
cause that is "directly attributable" to the employer or to the individual's
work.52 States also generally disqualify claimants who have been termi-
categorization is avoided because cases often ignore or confuse the period for which benefits
are being sought. See note 269 infra. While the eligibility-disqualification distinction has also
led to confusion, it is a more desirable method of categorization since it is clearly enunciated in
the relevant statutes.
45 See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 22-4-15-2 (West 1981).
46 See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 288.040 (Supp. 1986).
47 See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 34-8-151 (Supp. 1987).
48 The lack of "labor market attachment" has been a preferred rationale for disqualifying
from the receipt of unemployment benefits women who left work due to pregnancy. See text
accompanying notes 141-50 infra.
49 Bums, Unemployment Compensation and Socio-Economic Objectives, 55 Yale L.J. 1, 8
(1945).
50 Id; see Rosettenstein, Unemployment Benefits and Family Policy in the United States,
20 Fam. L.Q. 393, 393 (1986).
51 Freeman, Able to Work and Available for Work, 55 Yale L.J. 123, 124 (1945). Under
this conception, the availability requirement often overlaps with the disqualifying condition
that a claimant must accept suitable work when offered. See text accompanying notes 54, 216
infra.
52 A recent survey of state laws indicates that 29 jurisdictions use the broad "without good
cause" formula, while 23 jurisdictions restrict "good cause" to cause directly attributable to or
connected with employment. The District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands
are included in these statistics, while the state of Colorado has not adopted either of these
approaches. Rosettenstein, supra note 50, at 396. But see Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Rela-
tions Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511, 515-16 (1987) (only "[a] few States" require that cause for termi-
nation be directly attributable to the employer); Porcher v. Brown, 459 U.S. 1150, 1152 (1983)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) (only nine jurisdictions use the "without good
cause" formula).
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nated from employment due to misconduct, 53 refusal to accept suitable
work,54 or a labor dispute.55 All of these disqualification provisions sup-
port the generally accepted notion that unemployment benefits should be
paid only in the event of involuntary unemployment incurred through no
fault of the claimant. 56
The term disqualification is perhaps misleading in that most states
do not disqualify the claimant from ever receiving benefits or even force
the claimant to repeat the initial base period requirements.5 7 Rather,
most state disqualification provisions postpone the receipt of benefits
either for a specified period of time after termination of employment 58 or
until the claimant has been re-employed and has earned a specified
amount of wages, usually a multiple of the weekly amount that would
have been received as unemployment benefits. 59
Most of the issues pertaining to unemployment benefits for pregnant
and formerly pregnant women have arisen in the context of the eligibility
criteria and the conditions for disqualification. Prior to discussing these
issues, however, it is important to outline the evolution of the statutory
and case law framework relating expressly to unemployment due to
pregnancy.
As noted above,6° the federal unemployment law contains certain
criteria that state unemployment laws must meet in order to make em-
ployers of that state eligible for the credit for state unemployment taxes
paid. The original Social Security Act contained only minimal limita-
53 See Kempfer, Disqualifications for Voluntary Leaving and Misconduct, 55 Yale L.J.
147, 160-66 (1945).
54 See Menard, Refusal of Suitable Work, 55 Yale L.J. 134 (1945). As was noted earlier,
this disqualification provision may overlap with the eligibility requirement that a claimant be
able and available to accept suitable work. See note 51 supra.
55 See Lesser, Labor Disputes and Unemployment Compensation, 55 Yale L.J. 167 (1945).
56 Harrison, supra note 38, at 118-19. The preamble of the Social Security 1936 Draft Bill
stated that "persons who are unemployed through no fault of their own" should qualify for
benefits. Id. at 118 (quoting Social Security Board, Draft Bills for State Unemployment Com-
pensation of the Pooled Fund and Employer Reserve Account Type (1936)). This language
was integrated into many states' laws. See Harrison, supra note 38, at 118.
57 See note 43 and accompanying text supra (discussing base period requirements).
58 See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 34-8-158(2) (Supp. 1987) (up to eleven weeks after a dis-
charge for misconduct); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1344(a)(1) (1987) (six to twelve weeks after a
discharge for misconduct); W. Va. Code § 21A-6-3(2) (1985) (six weeks following discharge
for misconduct).
59 See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 288.050(1) (Supp. 1986) (claimant must earn ten times the
weekly benefit amount); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, § 2-404 (West 1986) (claimant who leaves
voluntarily without good cause connected to work must earn ten times weekly benefit amount);
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1344(a)(2) (1987) (claimant who leaves work voluntarily without good
cause attributable to work or is discharged for gross misconduct must earn six times weekly
benefit amount).
60 See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
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tions on states. 61 In the 1970s, however, Congress added new require-
ments, particularly in the Unemployment Compensation Amendments of
1976.62 Those amendments extended the coverage of FUTA to agricul-
tural workers, household workers, and state and local government work-
ers;63 raised the federal unemployment tax rate and wage base;64 and
added five new requirements for state laws necessary for employers to
qualify for the federal tax credit. 65 Included among these requirements
was that codified at FUTA section 3304(a)(12), which mandates that "no
person shall be denied compensation under such State law solely on the
basis of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy. '66
Two important events occurred just prior to the enactment of the
1976 amendments to FUTA. The first of these events was the decision
by the United States Supreme Court in Turner v. Department of Employ-
ment Security.6 7 In that case, the Court struck down a state statute
which conclusively presumed that a pregnant woman was unable to
work, and therefore ineligible for unemployment benefits, for twelve
weeks prior to childbirth.68 Although reports from both the House and
the Senate indicate that Congress was aware of the Turner decision and
intended to codify that decision in its 1976 amendment of FUTA,69 this
could not have been the initial impetus for the bills which became the
Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, since the bills were
actually introduced a month before the Supreme Court's decision in Tur-
ner.70 The legislative history of section 3304(a)(12) can be read to sup-
61 These consisted mainly of the requirements that unemployment compensation be paid
through public agencies and that benefits could not be denied to workers who refused to take a
job which had become vacant due to a strike, which required or prohibited the joining of a
union, or which paid lower wages or had lower working conditions than the prevailing com-
munity standards for comparable work. See Hight, supra note 28, at 616.
62 Pub. L. No. 94-566, 90 Stat. 2667 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
63 Id. §§ 111, 112, 113, 115, 90 Stat. at 2667-70 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3306 (1982)).
64 Id. § 211, 90 Stat. at 2676 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 3306 (1982)).
65 Id. §§ 312, 314, 90 Stat. at 2679-80 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a) (1982)).
66 Id. § 312, 90 Stat. at 2679 (1976) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) (1982)). In addi-
tion to the requirement that an individual not be denied benefits solely on the basis of preg-
nancy, the 1976 amendments added the requirements that benefits not be paid to professional
athletes between seasons, that benefits not be paid to aliens not legally admitted to the United
States for permanent work or residence purposes, that benefits be reduced by the amount of
retirement benefits received, and that the records of state unemployment agencies be made
available to welfare agencies for determining eligibility for aid to families with dependent chil-
dren. These requirements were codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 3304(a)(13), (14), (15), and (16)
respectively.
67 423 U.S. 44 (1975).
68 See text accompanying notes 323-30 infra (discussing Turner).
69 See S. Rep. No. 1265, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 5997, 6013 [hereinafter S. Rep. No. 1265]; H.R. Rep. No. 755, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 50 (1975) [hereinafter H.R. Rep. No. 755].
70 H.R. 10210 was introduced in October of 1975. H.R. 10210, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
June 1988]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
port both the argument that the section was meant merely as a
codification of Turner and the argument that Congress intended that this
amendment have a broader scope. On the one hand, the report of the
Senate Finance Committee, issued several months after the Turner deci-
sion, included the broad statement that, "in a number of States, an indi-
vidual whose unemployment is related to pregnancy is barred from
receiving any unemployment benefits." t71 This seems to indicate that the
portion of the bill which became section 3304(a)(12) was meant to allow
pregnant and formerly pregnant employees to receive unemployment
benefits without meeting the eligibility and qualifications requirements.
On the other hand, the same Report went on to quote the Supreme
Court's decision in Turner.7 2 The Report summarized the action of Con-
gress as follows:
The committee bill includes, without modification, the provision
of the House bill which would prohibit States from continuing to en-
force any provision which denies unemployment compensation benefits
solely on the basis of pregnancy (or recency of pregnancy). Pregnant
individuals would, however, continue to be required to meet generally
applicable criteria of availability for work and ability to work.73
The House report on the bill seems to indicate that Congress in-
tended a broader focus for section 3304(a)(12), beyond just those statutes
containing a presumptive period of ineligibility. This report states: "At
the present time, 19 States have provisions which, in effect, deny benefits
because of pregnancy. They vary from State to State, but they are all
inequitable in that they deny benefits without regard to the woman's abil-
ity to work, availability for work, or efforts to find work." 74
The reference in the House report to the nineteen states is appar-
ently a reference to those states listed in a 1975 Unemployment Insur-
ance Program Letter, in which the Department of Labor listed a variety
(1975). The United States Supreme Court's decision in Turner was handed down on Novem-
ber 17, 1975. The petitioner in Wimberly considered this timing as an important indication
that § 3304(a)(12) was not meant merely as a codification of Turner. Brief for Petitioner at 20,
Wimberly v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511 (1987) (No. 85-129). How-
ever, the respondent, as well as the American Civil Liberties Union and others as amicus
curiae, dismissed this timing as unimportant, asserting that the legislative history following the
Turner decision indicates that the case itself was consistently proffered as the rationale behind
§ 3304(a)(12). Brief for Respondent at 32, Wimberly v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm'n,
479 U.S. 511 (1987) (No. 85-129); Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, National
Women's Political Caucus, and Cost Employment Project, as Amicus Curiae, at 10-11, Wim-
berly v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511 (1987) (No. 85-129).
71 S. Rep. No. 1265, supra note 69, at 19-21, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at
6013-15.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 21, 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 6015.
74 H.R. Rep. No. 755, supra note 69, at 50.
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of state statutes that discriminate on the basis of pregnancy, marital obli-
gations, and dependents' allowances.75 The issuance of this Letter was
the other important event surrounding the enactment of section
3304(a)(12). The Letter listed nineteen state statutes that expressly and
conclusively named pregnancy as a condition that would result in the
denial of unemployment benefits based either on ineligibility or disqualifi-
cation. As will become clear in the discussions that follow, 7 6 this listing
has remained a focal point of judicial interpretations of the prohibition in
section 3304(a)(12) against the denial of unemployment benefits "solely
on the basis of pregnancy."
B. Treatment of Pregnancy Within the Unemployment
Compensation System
Whether pregnant or formerly pregnant women should receive un-
employment benefits is a question that arises in a variety of contexts in
the application of both the federal and state unemployment insurance
laws. Prior to the enactment of section 3304(a)(12) of FUTA, many
state laws expressly denied pregnant or formetly pregnant women unem-
ployment benefits for reasons related solely to their pregnancy. In addi-
tion, both administrative agencies and state courts have denied, and
continue to deny, unemployment benefits to women who have separated
from employment due to pregnancy. 77
It is difficult to provide a coherent structure to the multitude of stat-
utes, cases, and administrative rulings that have dealt with pregnancy in
the context of unemployment compensation. Despite the fact that some
of the statutes and cases use the concepts of "ineligibility" for unemploy-
ment benefits and "disqualification" from the receipt of such benefits in-
terchangeably, this discussion will be divided into two such sections. The
first section will discuss those sources that deal with the eligibility of
pregnant or formerly pregnant women for benefits, and the second will
examine those sources that determine whether leaving work due to preg-
nancy results in disqualification for receipt of unemployment benefits.
Each of these sections will begin with a review of those state statutes
and administrative policies that expressly designated pregnancy as a basis
for the denial of unemployment benefits. As discussed above,78 in con-
junction with the congressional hearings on the enactment of FUTA sec-
tion 3304(a)(12) and the publicity surrounding the United States
75 United States Dep't of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Program Letter No. 33-75
(Dec. 8, 1975), reprinted in [1975-1979 Transfer Binder] 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) q
21,482 [hereinafter UIPL No. 33-75].
76 See text accompanying notes 407-09, 458-62, 471-75 infra.
77 See notes 103-38, 160-293 and accompanying text infra.
78 See text accompanying notes 75-76.
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Supreme Court's decision in Turner, the United States Department of
Labor released two Unemployment Insurance Program Letters whose
purpose was "[t]o inform the States of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in the Turner... case and its implications for State law provisions, inter-
pretations, and policies which provide for blanket disqualification or inel-
igibility of pregnant women."'79 Letter No. 33-75 consisted of a summary
of discriminatory state provisions relating to pregnancy, domestic and
marital obligations, and dependents' allowances. Among the forty-two
state statutes listed were the statutes of nineteen states that expressly re-
ferred to pregnancy as a condition for the denial of unemployment bene-
fits. s0 These included both statutes that rendered pregnant women per se
79 United States Dep't of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Program Letters No. 1-76
(Feb. 4, 1976), reprinted in [1975-1979 Transfer Binder] 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH)II
21,482 [hereinafter UIPL No. 1-76]; UIPL No. 33-75, supra note 75.
80 On May 4, 1976, a Department of Labor opinion letter was published containing a sy-
nopsis of several state laws regarding pregnancy and eligibility for unemployment benefits.
UIPL No. 33-75, supra note 75. In the ensuing 11 years, many of those statutes have either
been repealed entirely or changed significantly. The following is a list of the states mentioned
in the letter with the laws as they were in 1976 and the current version of the laws, if any:
ALABAMA. Under the former law, a claimant was eligible for benefits 10 weeks after mater-
nity leave. Beyond that, a claimant had to give three weeks' notice of her desire to return to
work and must not have refused reinstatement to suitable work in order to remain eligible.
Ala. Code § 214(B) (1975). The current law is the same. Ala. Code § 25-4-78(2) (1986). AR-
KANSAS. Under the former law, a claimant was disqualified if she voluntarily and without
good cause connected with work left her employment. The disqualification continued until she
had completed at least 30 days of paid work. No claimant could be disqualified because she
voluntarily left work due to pregnancy if the claimant made reasonable efforts to preserve her
job. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1106(a) (1976 & Supp. 1985). The current law is the same. Ark.
Stat. Ann. § 11-10-513 (1987). CALIFORNIA. UIPL No. 33-75 did not mention a former
California law that authorized benefits for women denied maternity leave after giving birth
who had voluntarily quit employment. See Cal. Unempl. Ins. Code § 1264.2 (West 1986).
This section was repealed in 1978. Id. COLORADO. Under the former law, if claimant left
voluntarily prior to childbirth, she was disqualified until termination of pregnancy; if she left
involuntarily, she was eligible until 30 days before birth. After childbirth, a claimant was
disqualified until she had worked 13 weeks, unless she was the sole supporter of a child, in
which case she was eligible 30 days after childbirth. Col. Rev. Stat. 8-73-108. This law was
repealed in 1984. See Colo. Rev. Stat. 8-73-108(8) (1986). DELAWARE. Under the former
law, a claimant was disqualified for any week she was unable to work or unavailable for work
because of pregnancy; to establish availability after childbirth, a doctor's certificate was re-
quired. Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 3315(9). Under the current law, sub-section nine no longer
relates to pregnancy. The current law disqualifies anyone who leaves work voluntarily without
good cause attributable to the work. Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 3315 (1985). DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA. Under the former law, a claimant was disqualified six weeks before and six
weeks after childbirth. D.C. Code Ann. § 46-310(h) (1973). Under the current law, the eligi-
bility of pregnant or formerly pregnant women is to be determined under the same standards
as for any other claimant. D.C. Code Ann. § 46-111(b) (1987). INDIANA. Under the for-
mer law, a claimant was disqualified from the time of separation until she earned 10 times the
weekly benefit amount, but only if she failed to apply for or accept leave under the employer's
plan. See Ind. Code Ann. § 22-4-15-1 (West 1981). Under the current law, a person is ineligi-
ble for benefits if she fails without good cause to apply for work, to accept an offer of work, or
to return to her customary self-employment. The ineligibility continues until the individual
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ineligible for unemployment benefits and statutes that expressly disquali-
fied women who had terminated their employment due to pregnancy.
The Utah statute struck down by the Supreme Court in Turner fell into
earns an amount equal to eight times the benefit amount. Id. § 22-4-15-2. KANSAS. Under
the former law, a claimant was deemed unavailable for work 90 days before and 30 days after
birth. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-705(c) (1949). This law has been repealed. See Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 44-705(c) (1986). KENTUCKY. The current law does not specifically mention pregnancy,
though disqualification applies to any employee who voluntarily leaves work without good
cause attributable to the employment. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 341.370(1)(c) (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1983). MARYLAND. Under the former law, the claimant was disqualified for any
period of disability as a result of pregnancy. Md. Ann. Code art. 95A, § 6(f). This statute has
been repealed. See Md. Ann. Code art. 95A, § 6(f) (1985). MINNESOTA. Under the former
law, a claimant was disqualified from the date of separation until she had had two weeks of
insured work. Minn. Stat. § 268.09(2) (1959). This statute was repealed in 1977. See Minn.
Stat. § 268.09(2) (Supp. 1988). MISSISSIPPI. Under the former law, an individual was dis-
qualified from the receipt of benefits until she had earned at least eight times the weekly benefit
amount, if she left work for marital, domestic, or filial circumstances and obligations. Miss.
Code Ann. § 71-5-513(1) (1972). The current law is the same, except the state has added a
sentence saying pregnancy shall not be deemed to be a marital, filial, or domestic circumstance
for the purposes of this provision. Miss. Code Ann. § 71-5-513(1) (Supp. 1987). MONTANA.
Under the former law, a claimant was disqualified if she left her job during and due to preg-
nancy, and was then ineligible for two months, both before and after childbirth. Mont. Code
Ann. § 39-51-2302 (1973). This statute has been repealed. See Mont. Code Ann. § 39-51-2302
(1987). NEVADA. Under the former law, an individual was disqualified if unemployed due to
pregnancy. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 612,435 (1973). This statute has been repealed. See Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 452 (1973). NEW JERSEY. Under the former law, an individual was deemed unavail-
able for work four weeks before and four weeks after childbirth. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43:21-
4(c)(1) (West 1962). The current law no longer mentions pregnancy. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43:21-
4(c)(1) (West Supp. 1987). OHIO. Under the former law, an individual was not entitled to
benefits if she quit work due to pregnancy. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4141.29(D)(2)(c) (Ander-
son 1973). The reference to pregnancy has been deleted under the current law. Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 4141.29(D)(2)(c) (Anderson 1980). OREGON. Under the former law, an indi-
vidual was presumed unable to work if unemployed because of pregnancy. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 657.155 (1973). This statute has been repealed. See Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 657.155 (1987).
RHODE ISLAND. Under the former law, there existed a rebuttable presumption of inability
to work from four months before, to six weeks after childbirth. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-44-6(B)
(1972). This statute has been repealed. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-44-12 (1986). TENNES-
SEE. Under the former law, an individual was disqualified due to pregnancy from the date of
separation until 20 days after claimant was able to work. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1324(a)
(1974). Under the current law, pregnancy is to be treated like other disabilities. Tenn. Code
Ann. § 50-7-303(1) (1983). TEXAS. Under the former law, by administrative policy, claim-
ant was deemed unavailable for work from the date of separation until six weeks after child-
birth. See UIPL No. 33-75, supra note 75. Under the current law, a claimant is disqualified if
she left employment voluntarily without good cause connected with work. No claimant still
available for work is disqualified for leaving due to pregnancy. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
5221b-3 (Vernon 1987). UTAH. Under the former law, a claimant was disqualified for twelve
weeks before and six weeks after childbirth, or for any week of unemployment due to preg-
nancy. Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-5(h) (1953). This statute was repealed in 1976. See Utah
Code Ann. § 35-4-5 (Supp. 1987). WEST VIRGINIA. Under the former law, a claimant was
disqualified from the time of separation until she worked 30 days in covered employment.
Disqualification would be for no more than six weeks before and six weeks after childbirth
with medical evidence of ability to work. W. Va. Code § 2366(78)(6) (1961). Under the cur-
rent law there are no express references to pregnancy. See W. Va. Code § 21A-6.3(6) (1985).
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this category of statutes that discriminated expressly on the grounds of
pregnancy. Obviously, as a result of the Turner decision and the enact-
ment of section 3304(a)(12), most of the statutes that singled out preg-
nancy for discriminatory treatment are no longer in effect. However,
vestiges of this attitude-the treatment of pregnancy as a unique unem-
ployment situation-remain both in administrative rulings and in cases.
The sections on eligibility and disqualification each then deal with
the construction and application of "neutral laws"-those that do not
expressly name pregnancy as a condition that would result in the denial
of unemployment benefits. Into this latter set of laws falls the type of
statute examined by the Fourth Circuit in Brown v. Porcher,81 and later
by the United States Supreme Court in Wimberly v. Labor & Industrial
Relations Commission.82
A final section discusses those cases decided before Wimberly that
examined the validity of statutes which resulted in the denial of unem-
ployment benefits to pregnant or formerly pregnant women. It discusses
both constitutional challenges, such as the challenge upheld in Turner,
and challenges made under FUTA section 3304(a)(12), such as those in
Brown and Wimberly.
L Eligibility of Pregnant or Formerly Pregnant Women for
Unemployment Benefits
As discussed above, 83 an individual generally is deemed to be "ineli-
gible" to receive unemployment benefits unless he or she is both "able"
to work and "available" for work. As one court has noted, the purpose
of requirements such as these is "to make sure that compensation is not
paid to those who choose not to work, that the compensation law does
not encourage idleness, and that it does not weaken the willingness of the
individual to provide for himself through employment." '84
a. State statutes expressly naming pregnancy as grounds for ineligi-
bility. Many of the state statutes listed in Department of Labor Letter
No. 35-7585 automatically defined pregnant women who left their jobs as
unable to work or unavailable for work. Some of these statutes deline-
ated certain pre- and post-childbirth periods as periods of automatic inel-
igibility. 86 A statute of this type was struck down as unconstitutional in
the Supreme Court's per curiam opinion in Turner v. Department of Em-
81 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983).
82 479 U.S. 511 (1987).
83 See text accompanying notes 45-51 supra.
84 Algiers Homestead Assoc. v. Brown, 246 La. 738, 743, 167 So. 2d 349, 351 (1964).
85 Note 75 supra.
86 See note 80 supra.




In contrast to the statutes that delineated periods of presumed ineli-
gibility for unemployment benefits, another type of state statute created a
rebuttable presumption that a woman who had left employment due to
pregnancy was not able to work and therefore not eligible for unemploy-
ment benefits. Under this type of statute, a woman was ineligible until
she had proof, usually in the form of a doctor's certificate, that she was
able and available to resume employment.8 8 Courts were somewhat leni-
ent in construing such statutes in cases where an employee was forced by
the employer to discontinue work due to her pregnancy. 89 For example,
in Guerra v. Archie,90 an employee was discharged when her employer
found out from another employee that she was two months pregnant. 91
The employee was denied unemployment benefits on the basis of a Ne-
vada statute providing that an individual was disqualified for benefits
from the point in time in which the individual was "separated from work
because of pregnancy" until the individual submitted proof of ability to
work following childbirth.92 The Nevada statute also contained a section
which provided that "a claimant's unemployment shall be deemed to be
due to pregnancy if such unemployment existed within sixty days of ex-
pected confinement." 93 Considering the two sections together, the court
concluded that the only time in which a pregnancy-related termination
was a per se disqualification for benefits was during the sixty days imme-
diately preceding the expected birth.94 Otherwise, the court directed that
87 423 U.S. 44 (1975); see text accompanying notes 323-30 infra.
88 The Department of Labor recorded the existence of such statutes in Delaware, Mary-
land, Montana, Nevada, Ohio, and West Virginia. See UIPL No. 33-75, supra note 75.
89 Such mandatory leave policies have been subjected to increased scrutiny since the enact-
ment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) in 1978. See Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat.
2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)). One of the most important purposes of the
PDA, as noted in the legislative history, was to prohibit employers from forcing pregnant
women who were actually able to work to take maternity leaves of absence. H.R. Rep. No.
948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4749, 4754. A
recent example of this scrutiny appears in Carney v. Martin Luther Home, Inc., 824 F.2d 643
(8th Cir. 1987), in which a home for mentally retarded persons placed an employee who was
four and one half months pregnant on unpaid maternity leave. The employer realized the
employee was still fully able to work but claimed that the leave was justified by its concern for
the employee's health and its own potential liability if the employee or a patient was injured.
Id. at 647. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the employer had not
established that its considerations concerning the employee's pregnancy constituted a bona fide
occupational qualification. Id. at 649. But see note 114 infra (discussing airlines' mandatory
maternity leave policies that have been successfully defended on grounds of passenger safety).
90 88 Nev. 172, 494 P.2d 957 (1972).
91 Id. at 172, 494 P.2d at 958.
92 Nev. Rev. Stat. § 612.435 (1967) (repealed 1973).
93 Id. § 612.440(2). These two statutes seem to have confused the distinction between dis-
qualification for benefits and ineligibility for benefits. See note 44 supra.
94 Guerra, 88 Nev. at 173, 494 P.2d at 958.
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the unemployment commission should decide eligibility and qualification
based upon the facts and circumstances of each case.95 The court con-
cluded, consequently, that ,the employee was not automatically disquali-
fied from receiving employment benefits at any time other than the sixty
days prior to childbirth. 96
A similar result was reached earlier in Kugler v. Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review.97 There, an employee had been dis-
charged when she was six weeks pregnant because her employers were
concerned about her personal safety.98 The Pennsylvania unemployment
compensation law provided that a claimant for unemployment benefits
would be "conclusively presumed to be unavailable for work with respect
to any weeks of unemployment attributable to pregnancy." 99 The Kugler
court, however, refused to apply that provision of the statute to this par-
ticular claimant, finding her both willing and able to perform her usual
work at the time she was separated from employment.100 The court
concluded:
If the legislature had intended to make pregnancy per se a disqual-
ification for benefits, it would undoubtedly have said so in explicit lan-
guage. However, it did not, and in view of the purpose of the act to
relieve the rigors of involuntary unemployment, the only logical con-
struction to be placed upon "attributable to pregnancy" is that if preg-
nancy affected the work or health of an employee and as a result she
was either discharged or left her employment, she would not be enti-
tled to benefits.101
In addition to these two types of statutes which rendered pregnant
women per se unavailable for work, a third set of state statutes and ad-
ministrative policies dictated that a woman on a maternity leave of ab-
sence was automatically ineligible for unemployment benefits.10 2 Under
these statutes, if a woman left on maternity leave, whether voluntarily or
due to a mandate by her employer, she was automatically considered,
while on that leave, to be unavailable for work. These statutes, therefore,
95 Id. The Court based its decision on an interpretation of a similar statute by the Supreme
Court of Kansas in Boeing Co. v. Kansas Employment Sec. Bd. of Review, 193 Kan. 287, 392
P.2d 904 (1964). Guerra, 88 Nev. at 173, 494 P.2d at 958.
96 Guerra, 88 Nev. at 173, 494 P.2d at 958.
97 177 Pa. Super. 550, 112 A.2d 453 (1955).
98 Id. at 551, 112 A.2d at 453.
99 Act approved Aug. 24, 1953, No. 396, § 3, 1953 Pa. Laws 1397 (repealed 1971).
100 177 Pa. Super. at 553, 112 A.2d at 454.
101 Id. at 552, 112 A.2d at 454. The court in this case used the term disqualification but
seems to be referring to an eligibility statute.
102 According to the Department of Labor Letter, the following states considered a woman
ineligible for unemployment benefits from the "date of separation" from work with her em-
ployer: Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Minnesota, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia.
UIPL No. 33-75, supra note 75.
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allowed employer policies to dictate periods of unavailability for preg-
nant workers, since the length of an employee's maternity leave of ab-
sence was determined not by statute but rather by the employer's leave
policy.
b. Eligibility under neutral statutes. Even when statutes do not
single out pregnancy for special treatment, the unemployment agencies
of some states consider women who are on maternity leaves of absence to
be unavailable for work simply by virtue of the nature of the leave. This
presumption applies both to pregnant women and women who have re-
cently given birth; it applies despite the fact that the state statute does
not delineate pregnancy as a condition imposing ineligibility.
The application of this rule to pregnant women who terminated em-
ployment with one employer but were seeking less physically taxing em-
ployment prior to childbirth was explained in Lauderdale v. Division of
Employment Security.10 3 In this case, the claimant, under her doctor's
orders, took a leave from work five months prior to the date of delivery
of her child.10 4 The claimant's doctor, however, agreed that she was
physically able to do lighter work during the months prior to child-
birth.10 5 The claimant contacted at least two potential employers per
week in her unsuccessful search for such employment. 10 6 The state un-
employment commission denied her application for benefits, however,
determining that "she was ineligible for benefits because she was on ma-
ternity leave of absence and was not considered available for work."' 0 7
The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the commission's decision,
stating:
[T]he [Labor and Industrial Relations] Commission could find that the
claimant was not genuinely attached to the labor market since by ac-
cepting the leave of absence she limited her availability for work be-
cause the very conditions limiting her availability for her regular
employment also substantially limited her from performing suitable
work for other employers, and her intention to return to her regular
job, which her employer admittedly was holding for her, after the birth
of the child limited her employment opportunities.10 8
Under this theory, because the employee was not able to work for her
current employer, she was found to be unavailable for any work with any
103 605 S.W.2d 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
104 Id. at 175.
105 Id. at 176. The claimant's current employment as a cashier and stock clerk involved too
much heavy lifting and prolonged periods of standing. Her physician had given her a note
permitting her to do light work not involving excessive walking. Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 178.
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employer. 109
Women with the least amount of training and job skills are apt to
suffer the most under this theory. For example, in Petty v. University of
Delaware,1 10 a custodian was forced to leave work due to medical com-
plications early in her pregnancy that resulted in her inability to continue
heavy lifting and prolonged standing.111 Due to her physical condition
and her lack of training in secretarial or clerical work, the unemployment
board found, and the court affirmed, that the claimant was unable to
perform any job functions for which she was qualified and thus was ineli-
gible to receive unemployment benefits.1 12
On the other hand, most courts that have examined "neutral" state
eligibility laws in the case of a pregnant woman who wishes to continue
to work have concluded that pregnancy alone does not automatically
render a woman unavailable for work. For example, in Baeza v. Pan
American/National Airlines,113 a Florida court refused to hold that flight
attendants who were not allowed to fly when pregnant, and who were
receiving accumulated sick pay during their maternity leaves, were auto-
matically unable to work and thus ineligible for benefits.' 14 The Baeza
court distinguished these flight attendants, who had "not been shown to
be unavailable for other work in positions that do not require flying,"' 15
from the claimant in Monsanto v. Florida Department of Labor & Em-
ployment Security,116 who, the evidence clearly indicated, was not able to
work during the period of her company-approved maternity leave.117
109 But see Freeman, supra note 51, at 126. Although the Freeman article was written long
before the decision in the Lauderdale case, Freeman noted that:
[U]nemployment compensation was never intended to be used for the purpose of re-
stricting the mobility of workers, nor was the availability requirement intended so to
restrict the workers. The purpose of the availability requirement is to test a claimant's
attachment to a labor market, not his attachment to one occupation or to one employer.
Id.
110 450 A.2d 392 (Del. 1982).
111 Id. at 394.
112 Id. at 397. This author finds it extremely difficult to believe that the only jobs for which
a person lacking secretarial skills is qualified are those involving heavy lifting and prolonged
standing. This reasoning indicates, among other things, that an individual who uses a wheel-
chair and has no secretarial skills is not qualified to perform any job.
113 392 So. 2d 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
114 Id. at 924. The mandatory maternity leave policies of airlines have been upheld against
challenges that they violate the Pregnancy Discrimination Act on the grounds they are neces-
sary for insuring passenger safety. See Levin v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir.
1984); Harriss v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980). But see
Battersby v. Caldwell, IB Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) $ 1950 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 1981) (union
agreement rendering pregnant airline attendants ineligible for unemployment benefits by cate-
gorizing maternity leaves as "voluntary" violates equal protection principles).
115 Baeza, 392 So. 2d at 924.
116 371 So. 2d 594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
117 Id. at 595; see Baeza, 392 So. 2d at 924; see also School Bd. of Volusia v. Florida Dept.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 63:532
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
In Gols v. Ross,118 a claimant was discharged by her employer due to
pregnancy.1 19 In the last weeks of her pregnancy she made several un-
successful attempts to find work. 120 She was then denied unemployment
benefits by the state agency on the ground that she was not available for
work.1 21 The New York court reversed the denial, stating that "[t]he
fact that a woman is pregnant ... does not automatically disqualify her
from the availability of benefits." 122
The state of Pennsylvania has established through case law that "a
woman may not be presumed unavailable for work simply because she
was placed on a pregnancy leave of absence." 123 However, the additional
question of whether the leave of absence is "voluntary" will have a bear-
ing on eligibility for unemployment benefits. For example, in both
Wincek v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Board of Re-
view 124 and Bogucki v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 125 the claimants, in the later months of their
pregnancies, took maternity leaves of absence when they found they
could not perform the ordinary duties of their jobs. Each employee of-
fered a note from her doctor indicating that she was still able to do less
physically taxing work. In both cases, the court rejected as a matter of
law a presumption that an individual on a maternity leave is unavailable
for work.126 However, the court distinguished between cases in which
the leave of absence was voluntary and cases in which it was involun-
tary.127 In Bogucki, the facts indicated that the claimant had requested
lighter work from her employer and had taken a leave of absence only
when such work was not available. 128 The court stated that "the preg-
of Labor & Employment Sec., 393 So. 2d 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (teacher on maternity
leave admittedly was unable to work and did not actively seek work during period for which
she was denied benefits).
118 59 A.D.2d 994, 399 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1977).
119 Id. at 994, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
120 See id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 995, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
123 Wineek v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 50 Pa.
Commw. 237, 240, 412 A.2d 699, 701 (1980); see also Pennsylvania Elec. Co. v. Common-
wealth, Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 69 Pa. Commw. 214, 450 A.2d 779
(1982) (pregnant woman placed on unpaid sick leave, rather than maternity leave, cannot
automatically be presumed unavailable for work).
124 50 Pa. Commw. 237, 412 A.2d 699 (1980) (remanded to Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review for factual determination of "voluntariness"), aff'd on reh'g, 64 Pa. Commw.
201, 439 A.2d 890 (1982).
125 54 Pa. Commw. 419, 421 A.2d 528 (1980).
126 Bogucki, 54 Pa. Commw. at 423, 421 A.2d at 530; Wincek, 50 Pa. Commw. at 239, 412
A.2d at 701.
127 Bogucki, 54 Pa. Commw. at 423, 421 A.2d at 530; Wincek, 50 Pa. Commw. at 240, 412
A.2d at 701.
128 Bogucki, 54 Pa. Commw. at 420, 421 A.2d at 529.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
June 1988]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
nant woman's acceptance of a leave of absence is not voluntary and...
she cannot for this reason alone be held ineligible under [Pennsylvania
unemployment law]." 129 On the other hand, in Wincek, the court re-
manded the case to the Unemployment Compensation Board to deter-
mine whether the claimant's leave of absence was voluntary or
involuntary. 130
Some courts that have applied the presumption of unavailability
have extended it beyond pregnancy to the time following childbirth when
a new mother may still be technically on a maternity leave of absence.
For example, in Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Depart-
ment of Industrial Relations, 1 31 an Alabama appellate court affirmed the
denial of benefits to a claimant on maternity leave under a company pol-
icy that required leaves to begin sixty days prior to the probable date of
childbirth 132 and allowed an employee additional time after childbirth up
to a maximum of two years. 133 Further, it was the company's policy that
"as a general rule a woman should not return to work earlier than six to
eight weeks after giving birth to a child."'134 When the claimant, who
originally had requested a one year leave of absence, returned to work
two months after the birth of her child, she was informed by the com-
pany that there was no work available for her. In upholding the board's
denial of benefits, the court held that in requesting the maternity leave
for one year the claimant had "voluntarily" removed herself from the
labor force and therefore did not meet the availability requirement.1 35
The Southern Bell court distinguished the case from those in which
an employee is required to take a leave for a minimum amount of time.
For example, in Allegretti v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensa-
129 Id. at 421, 421 A.2d at 530. The question of voluntariness is often a difficult one to
prove. For example, in Hamelers v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Bd. of
Review, 48 Pa. Commw. 121, 408 A.2d 1198 (1979), the claimant testified that she had re-
quested lighter work during the later months of her pregnancy, but that her employer was
unable to provide such work and placed her on a leave of absence. Id. at 123, 408 A.2d at
1199. Despite this evidence, the board determined that her leave was "voluntary," based only
on the fact that her doctor had advised her to take a leave of absence. Id. at 123-24, 408 A.2d
at 1199. The reviewing court reversed the board's determination, finding that the board had
"capriciously disregarded" the claimant's testimony and reached its conclusion on less than "a
scintilla" of evidence. Id. at 124, 408 A.2d at 1199.
130 50 Pa. Commw. at 240, 412 A.2d at 701. In addition, the court asked the board to
determine whether there was other work available with the claimant's employer and the time
at which the employee did in fact become unavailable for any type of work. Id.
131 42 Ala. App. 351, 165 So. 2d 128 (1964).
132 See note 114 and accompanying text supra (discussing mandatory maternity leave
policies).
133 Southern Bell, 42 Ala. App. at 354, 165 So. 2d at 130-31.
134 Id. at 354, 165 So. 2d at 131.
135 Id. at 356-57, 165 So. 2d at 133.
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tion Board of Review, 136 the claimant's employer had a policy whereby a
mother could not be reemployed until at least two months after the birth
of her child. The claimant originally requested a one year leave of ab-
sence; however, approximately thirty days after the birth of her child, she
attempted to return to work.137 The court held that the claimant was
eligible for unemployment compensation since she was not reemployed
solely because of her employer's required leave policy.138
Under some of the cases described above, a woman may be found
ineligible to receive unemployment benefits on the basis of a presumption
that she does not meet the eligibility requirements of ability and availa-
bility, regardless of her actual ability and availability. However, pre-
sumed ineligibility is only part of the problem. At the time of the
enactment of FUTA section 3304(a)(12), there existed a variety of stat-
utes that focused not on the eligibility of a pregnant or formerly pregnant
woman to receive benefits, but on whether the manner of her termination
from her prior employment disqualified her from receiving unemploy-
ment benefits.
2. Disqualification of Pregnant and Formerly Pregnant Women from
the Receipt of Unemployment Benefits
As was noted above, 139 an individual who is able to, and available
for, work-"eligible" to receive unemployment benefits-may still be dis-
qualified from receiving benefits due to the circumstances under which
she left her previous employment. This Section will examine the statutes
and cases dealing with disqualification, beginning, as in the preceding
Section, with those statutes which disqualify expressly on the basis of
pregnancy and then proceeding to facially neutral statutes and their sub-
sequent judicial interpretations.
a. State statutes expressly naming pregnancy as grounds for dis-
qualification. Prior to, and at the time of, the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Turner v. Department of Employment Security,14° a
number of state statutes expressly disqualified women from receiving un-
employment benefits if the termination of their previous employment was
due to pregnancy.1 4 ' The rationale for such statutes was grounded in the
136 14 Pa. Commw. 576, 324 A.2d 860 (1974).
137 Id. at 577, 324 A.2d at 860.
138 Id. at 577, 324 A.2d at 860. The same result was reached in Polk County Intermediate
Educ. Dist. v. Employment Div., 24 Or. App. 169, 544 P.2d 1073 (1976). In that case, a
school teacher sought to return to her teaching position one month after the birth of her child,
even though her employer's leave policy entailed a six month leave.
139 See text accompanying notes 45-59 supra.
140 423 U.S. 44 (1975).
141 Statutes of this type existed in Colorado, Indiana, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, and
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notion that child-bearing women were not deemed to be among those
active, "attached" members of the workforce for whom unemployment
compensation, as income replacement in the event of temporary unem-
ployment, was designed.142
In some of the state statutes which disqualified an employee if her
separation from employment was due to pregnancy, an exception was
made for employees who applied for and obtained a leave of absence
from their employers. 143 The rationale behind this exception was that
employees who make an attempt to preserve their employment are not
abandoning the work force when they take leaves of absence; thus, they
maintain the necessary labor market attachment. 144 In Auger v. Adminis-
trator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 145 the court examined a Con-
necticut statute146 which required an employee who left work due to
pregnancy to earn wages of at least $100 before she again became quali-
fied to receive unemployment benefits. The statute contained an excep-
tion covering situations "where an employer has, by collective bargaining
agreement, provided for reemployment for such woman after childbirth,
and she has, within two months, applied without restrictions, for reem-
Ohio. See UIPL No. 33-75, supra note 75. One statute not included on the Department of
Labor's list, but which would clearly fall into this category was the Florida statute discussed in
General Tel. v. Board of Review, 356 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. App. 1978). This statute defined "good
cause" for leaving employment as "only such cause as is attributable to the illness or disability
of the individual, other than pregnancy." See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 443.101(1)(a) (1975) (repealed
1977). A disqualification for benefits usually takes the form of a deferral of eligibility until the
claimant has been reemployed for a stated period of time or has earned a set amount of wages.
See text accompanying notes 57-59 supra.
142 Curry v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 20 Conn. Supp. 428, 138
A.2d 805 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1957). The Curry court noted that
[a] pregnant woman, although not ill in the ordinary sense of the word and not
physically unable to work, is in a distinct category of workers. Her condition generally
requires that she be treated with greater care than the ordinary employee. Her dependa-
bility as to attendance on the job generally may be doubtful. Her ability to work is
always temporary for the reason that it will terminate on a predetermined date, unlike
the ordinary employee.
... It is doubtful whether a person in such physical condition is genuinely attached
to the industrial labor market. It is doubtful also in the light of her tenuous attachment
to the industrial labor market whether her loss of income when unemployed is due to the
lack of available employment in the market place. The solution of her problem lies in
the field of maternity benefits, which the unemployment compensation act does not
provide.
Id. at 432-33, 138 A.2d at 808.
143 See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1106(a) (1976 & Supp. 1985); Ind. Code Ann. § 22-4-15-1
(West 1981). It should be remembered, however, that a maternity leave of absence sometimes
may render an employee ineligible to receive benefits during the course of the leave. See text
accompanying notes 102-12, 131-35 supra.
144 See Gilooly v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 76 Pa. Commw. 20, 462
A.2d 958, 959 (1983).
145 19 Conn. Supp. 184, 110 A.2d 645 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1954).
146 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 2315c (1953).
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ployment in the same job or a comparable job." 147 The claimant in the
Auger case left her employment under a leave of absence negotiated in
accordance with a collective bargaining agreement. 148 However, when
she was able to return to work, she discovered that the company had
closed down permanently. 149 The court affirmed the decision of the un-
employment commission to award benefits to the claimant, finding that
her taking of a leave of absence indicated that she desired to work and
had set up no restrictions as to hours of work, type of work, or wages.150
A somewhat different result was reached in the case of Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. v. Thornbrough.151 In this case, the employee re-
quested a leave of absence under her employer's policy of granting one
year pregnancy leaves.1 52 At the time she took the leave, and again, soon
after the birth of her child, the claimant expressed a desire to return to
work within a much shorter period. However, when she applied for
work, she was told that there would be no job available for her for three
or four more months.1 53 The Arkansas statute provided that a woman
who left work due to pregnancy would have to be reemployed for thirty
days in order to qualify for unemployment benefits.1 54 This statute ex-
plicitly excepted individuals who obtained a leave of absence from the
employer and applied for reinstatement, but were not reinstated "at the
termination of such leave."1 55 Narrowly construing the statutory lan-
guage, the court held that the claimant was not qualified to receive unem-
ployment benefits because her leave of absence had not been
"terminated."1 56 This case illustrates the overlap that exists between
cases dealing with disqualification and those dealing with eligibility.
Although the statute at issue was clearly a disqualification statute, the
effect of the court's decision is to render the claimant presumptively "un-
available" for work-and thus ineligible for benefits-during the term of
the leave of absence.1 57
b. Disqualification under neutral statutes. In addition to constru-
ing statutes that expressly delineated termination due to pregnancy as a
cause for disqualification, courts have examined the effect of neutral dis-
147 Id.
148 Auger, 19 Conn. Supp. at 185, 110 A.2d at 646.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 186-87, 110 A.2d at 647.
151 232 Ark. 929, 341 S.W.2d 1 (1960).
1S2 Id. at 930, 341 S.W.2d at 2.
153 Id.
154 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1106(e) (2) (Supp. 1957).
155 Id.
1S6 Thornbrough, 232 Ark. at 935, 341 S.W.2d at 5.
157 See text accompanying notes 103-38 supra.
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qualification statutes on pregnant and formerly pregnant workers. These
statutes are "neutral" in the sense that they do not name pregnancy as a
disqualifying condition. Rather, under these statutes, women who leave
work due to pregnancy may be denied benefits because they are deemed
to have quit work voluntarily or without an acceptable "cause." This is
the type of statute that was examined by the Fourth Circuit in Brown v.
Porcher15s and by the United States Supreme Court in Wimberly v. La-
bor & Industrial Relations Commission.159
These "neutral" state statutes can be divided into three groups,
prohibiting benefits to employees who have left "voluntarily without
good cause," "voluntarily without cause of a necessitous and compelling
nature," or "voluntarily without good cause directly attributable to the
employer."
(i) "Voluntary" leaving. The concept of denying benefits to indi-
viduals who leave their employment voluntarily has existed since the ear-
liest state unemployment laws. The draft bill which served as the model
for so many of these state laws contained the "public policy" statement
that the purpose of the unemployment law was " 'the compulsory setting
aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons un-
employed through no fault of their own'." 16° Soon after the enactment
of these statutes, courts began a long debate over whether the involun-
tariness concept was restricted solely to those actions not performed by
the employee's own motion-for example, the employee was discharged
and thus left "involuntarily"-or included actions in fact performed by
the worker but compelled by external factors-for instance, the employee
resigns because the job endangers her physically. 161 As expressed by one
advocate of the broader reading, "the test of what is voluntary is more
than what is done on the worker's own motion which, like the short jour-
ney to the electric chair of the man who walks erect, may be the product
158 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983).
159 479 U.S. 511 (1987). These neutral statutes pervasively affect women (and men, as well),
since they may lead to disqualification when an employee leaves work for a variety of personal
reasons, including illness and the marital and domestic circumstances of the employee. In-
cluded in the list of discriminatory laws compiled in UIPL No. 33-75 by the Department of
Labor were 14 state statutes that expressly denied unemployment benefits to workers who left
their employment due to domestic or marital obligations. See UIPL No. 33-75, supra note 75.
In a letter accompanying this list, the Department of Labor urged states "to take the opportu-
nity to seek to change by legislation all discriminatory provisions in their unemployment insur-
ance laws." UIPL No. 1-76, supra note 79.
160 Harrison, supra note 38, at 118 (quoting Social Security Board, Draft Bills for State
Unemployment Compensation of the Pooled Fund and Employer Reserve Account Type
(1936)). The voluntariness question has also been used in determining eligibility for unemploy-
ment compensation in Pennsylvania. See text accompanying notes 124-30 supra.
161 See Kempfer, supra note 53, at 154-55.
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of impelling circumstances."1 62
The fine line between voluntary and involuntary actions was ex-
amined in the following oft-quoted passage from Bliley Electric Co. v.
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review :163
"Voluntarily" and "involuntarily" are antonymous and therefore
irreconcilable words, but the words are merely symbols of ideas, and
the ideas can be readily reconciled. Willingness, wilfulness, volition,
intention reside in "voluntary," but the mere fact that a worker wills
and intends to leave a job does not necessarily and always mean that
the leaving is voluntary. Extraneous factors, the surrounding circum-
stances, must be taken into account, and when they are examined it
may be found that the seemingly voluntary, the apparently intentional,
act was in fact involuntary. A worker's physical and mental condition,
his personal and family problems, the authoritative demand of legal
duties-these are circumstances that exert pressure upon him and im-
periously call for decision and action. 64
The same conclusion-that external factors may affect voluntariness-
was reflected in another early construction of a state unemployment stat-
ute in Fannon v. Federal Cartridge Corp.165 In this case, the court ex-
pounded on the meaning of Minnesota's "public policy" statement,
which was identical to that in the Social Security draft bill: 166
There is nothing in this language to justify the conclusion that
benefits under the act accrue only when unemployment is the result of
some wrongful act or fault of an employer.... While [the claimant]
intended to terminate her employment, and to this extent it may be
argued that such termination was voluntary, on the other hand, it is
clear that her health and personal welfare made it imperative for her to
stop without further delay .... An act of necessity may not be a
voluntary act. We cannot escape the conclusion that where, as here an
employe [sic] is impelled because of sickness and disease to terminate
unemployment because continuance thereof would endanger his health
and personal welfare, such termination is an involuntary rather than a
voluntary act of the employee within the meaning of [the state
statute]. 167
162 Harrison, supra note 38, at 122.
163 158 Pa. Super. 548, 45 A.2d 898 (1946).
164 Id. at 556-57, 45 A.2d at 903.
165 219 Minn. 306, 18 N.W.2d 249 (1945).
166 See note 56 supra.
167 219 Minn. at 311-12, 18 N.W.2d at 252 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). When
a woman leaves work due to pregnancy, in most cases it can be argued that she is doing so
"voluntarily" because she chose to have a child. On a broader level, however, it must be
remembered that only women are physically capable of bearing children. Therefore, to the
extent propogation of our species remains a priority, and until scientific advances lead to an
alternative method of child-bearing, the "voluntariness" of pregnancy is somewhat doubtful.
Professor Wendy Williams has stated:
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In contrast, the word "voluntarily" was read narrowly in State v.
Hix.168 In that case, three claimants who left work for health reasons
were denied unemployment benefits because they were deemed to have
left work "voluntarily."' 169 The court defined that term in the limited
sense of "the free exercise of the will.' 17
0
Some states define voluntary leaving by reference to other words in
the statute. Massachusetts has a statutory provision stating that an em-
ployee's leaving is voluntary unless the "reasons for leaving were [of] an
urgent, compelling and necessitous nature."17' In Missouri, using an
ejusdem generis type of approach, the term "voluntarily" has been lim-
ited to leaving "without good cause attributable to her work or her em-
ployer"-another provision of the statute. 172 This has been interpreted
to mean that "one terminates employment involuntarily only if there is a
legally sufficient reason for leaving work which is causally connected to
the work or the employer." 173
(ii) Leaving without "good cause". In addition to using the word
"voluntarily," state statutes require that an employee show "cause" for
leaving her previous employment. The most liberal of these statutes deny
benefits only to claimants who left their prior employment voluntarily
and "without good cause." As noted in Bliley Electric Co. v. Unemploy-
ment Compensation Board of Review,174 this juxtaposition of terms gives
rise to the paradox "that an employee who voluntarily leaves his work
Individual pregnancies may be and often are voluntary in the sense that the individual
woman made a conscious choice to become pregnant. But, as a social matter, pregnancy
is not meaningfully voluntary any more than eating or sleeping is voluntary. All are
basic functions of the human animal necessary to survival.... There is considerable
wisdom in the comment, whose source I no longer recall, that "if pregnancy is volun-
tary, it's a very good thing that women volunteer." Without such "volunteers," there
would be no labor force at all.
Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate,
13 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 325, 354 n.114 (1984-85).
168 132 W. Va. 516, 54 S.E.2d 198 (1949).
169 Id. at 522-23, 54 S.E.2d at 201.
170 Id. at 522, 54 S.E.2d at 201. The harshness of this precedent was mitigated somewhat in
Gibson v. Rutledge, 298 S.E.2d 137 (W. Va. 1982). Although ostensibly adopting the Hix
court's definition of the word "voluntarily," the Gibson court held that the West Virginia
unemployment benefits system covered an employee who left work due to a health-related
problem, but upon recovery found that his employment had been terminated during his ab-
sence. See text accompanying notes 212-18 infra.
171 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151A, § 25(c)(1) (West 1982), construed in Dohoney v. Di-
rector of Div. of Employment Sec., 377 Mass. 333, 336, 386 N.E.2d 10, 13 (1979).
172 Duffy v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 556 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Mo. App. 1977); see
text accompanying notes 174-250 infra (discusssing statutes requiring this causal connection).
173 Duffy, 556 S.W.2d at 198.
174 158 Pa. Super. 548, 45 A.2d 898 (1946).
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with good cause is involuntarily unemployed." 175 Bliley was the first case
in which the Pennsylvania "good cause" provision was examined after
being enacted in 1942.176 In Bliley, the court reviewed the legislative
history of the 1942 act to determine the breadth of the "good cause"
requirement. The court noted that the "good cause" provision was en-
acted when other states were restricting the availability of benefits by
requiring that good cause be "connected with the work" or "attributable
to the employer," and that the legislature was aware of these changes.177
The court reasoned that since the legislature enacted the broad "good
cause" requirement with knowledge of the changes in other states, it
must have intended that purely personal reasons be included in the
phrase "good cause.'178
Based on this analysis, the court construed good cause to "connote
as minimum requirements, real circumstances, substantial reasons, objec-
tive conditions, palpable forces that operate to produce correlative re-
suits, adequate excuses that will bear the test of reason, just grounds for
action, and always the element of good faith."' 179 Applying this defini-
tion of good cause to the facts in Bliley, the court held that, in some
circumstances, marital obligations, such as leaving work to join a spouse
who was stationed by the Armed Forces in another location, can consti-
tute good cause. 180
In Flannick v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,"" the
same court, under the same Pennsylvania statute, considered the status
of an employee who left due to pregnancy. The claimant neither re-
quested a leave of absence before leaving nor attempted to be reinstated
with her former employer after she gave birth and became available for
work. 182 The court began its analysis by observing that, "it cannot be
175 Id. at 556, 45 A.2d at 903 (emphasis added).
176 The Pennsylvania statute, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 802(b) (Purdon 1964 & Supp.
1987), has undergone several transformations since its original enactment. In 1953, a provi-
sion that marital and domestic circumstances did not constitute "good cause" was added. Act
approved Aug. 24, 1953, No. 396, § 4, 1953 Pa. Laws 1397, 1405 (repealed 1980). In 1955, the
term "good cause" was replaced by "cause of a necessitous and compelling nature." Act ap-
proved Mar. 30, 1955, No. 5, § 5, 1955 Pa. Laws 6, 15. In 1959, a paragraph stating that
pregnancy was not a "cause of a necessitous and compelling nature" was added. Act approved
Dec. 17, 1959, No. 693, § 8, 1959 Pa. Laws 1893, 1909 (repealed 1974). This provision relat-
ing to pregnancy was deleted in 1974. Act approved Dec. 5, 1974, No. 261, § 3, 1974 Pa. Laws
769, 770.
177 Bliley, 158 Pa. Super. at 554-55, 45 A.2d at 902.
178 Id. at 555, 45 A.2d at 902.
179 Id. at 556, 45 A.2d at 903.
I0 Id. at 558-59, 45 A.2d at 904. Later versions of the Pennsylvania statute disqualified
claimants who terminated their employment to meet marital obligations. Act approved Aug.
24, 1953, No. 396, § 4, 1953 Pa. Laws 1397, 1405 (repealed 1980).
181 168 Pa. Super. 606, 82 A.2d 671 (1951).
182 Id. at 607, 82 A.2d at 672.
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asserted dogmatically and without reservation, that a pregnant woman
who leaves her employment does so voluntarily and without good
cause."' 183 The court advocated a case-by-case approach, noting that
pregnancy had varying effects on an individual's employment, depending
upon the nature of the work, the mother's health, and the childcare situa-
tion in the household. 184 The court, however, accepted the state's argu-
ment that benefits should be denied if the claimant failed to request a
leave of absence or failed to offer to return to work within a reasonable
time after giving birth.185 The court was swayed against the claimant
because she misrepresented her reason for leaving on her application for
unemployment benefits. 186 The court determined that the claimant "was
not animated by good faith"187 and thus affirmed the denial of benefits.188
As the concept of "good cause" is now generally construed by un-
employment agencies to include pregnancy, few recent cases have arisen
under this type of statute.'8 9 However, a "good cause" statute served as
the basis for the South Carolina practice of denying unemployment bene-
fits to pregnant women found to violate FUTA section 3304(a)(12) in
Brown v. Porcher.190 Also, a court in New Jersey found that certain preg-
nancy-related terminations of employment do not constitute leaving for
"good cause." The result in Medwick v. Board of Review, Division of
Employment Security,191 however, seemed to be based on a more individ-
183 Id. at 608, 82 A.2d at 672.
184 Id. at 608-09, 82 A.2d at 672-73.
185 Id. at 609-10, 82 A.2d at 673.
186 Id. at 608, 82 A.2d at 672-73.
187 The court appears to have drawn upon the Bliley court's definition of "good cause." See
text accompanying notes 174-80 supra.
188 168 Pa. Super. at 611, 82 A.2d at 673. The Flannick court affirmed the unemployment
board's requirement that an individual who leaves employment due to a temporary disability
must apply for a leave of absence or in some other way manifest her intention not to abandon
the labor force in order to be eligible to receive benefits. Id. at 610, 82 A.2d at 673; see text
accompanying notes 251-93 infra.
189 The breadth of the term "good cause" in the Nebraska statute is apparent in Glionna v.
Chizek, 204 Neb. 37, 281 N.W.2d 220 (1979), where an increased workload was found to
constitute "good cause" for leaving employment. Id. at 41, 281 N.W.2d at 223. The court
limited its holding by stating:
We do not say that any time an employee decides he or she does not like the job or
that it is burdensome or requires more skill than is possessed by the employee, voluntary
termination can be for "good cause." However, we do state that when an employee
accepts employment in good faith and through no fault or deficiency on his or her part
the workload becomes an increasingly unreasonable burden so as to affect the health or
sense of well-being of the employee, voluntary termination does have some justifiably
reasonable connection with or relation to conditions of employment and may be deemed
for "good cause."
Id.
190 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983); see text accompanying
notes 341-52 infra.
191 69 N.J. Super. 338, 174 A.2d 251 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961).
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ualized determination. In this case, a claimant who left her job when she
was five months pregnant, even though company policy allowed her to
work through her sixth month, was held to have left under no compelling
personal, health-related, or family circumstances, and thus to have left
"without good cause." 192
(iii) Leaving without "cause of a compelling and necessitous na-
ture" A somewhat more restrictive statutory standard than "good
cause" is the requirement that "cause of a compelling and necessitous
nature" be present. In Howell v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Com-
pensation Board of Review, 193 a Pennsylvania court held that the Penn-
sylvania statute 94 containing this language applied to pregnancy only to
the extent that pregnancy "is to be treated as any other disease that is
claimed to be cause of a necessitous and compelling nature for leaving
work." 195 In Howell, the claimant did not carry her burden of showing
that continuing to work in her ninth month of pregnancy posed a threat
to her own or her unborn baby's health. 196 Therefore, she was found to
have left work without having met the appropriate cause requirement. 197
Although the court conceded that a woman in her ninth month of preg-
nancy might be "uncomfortable," it declined to set up what it character-
ized as "a presumption that a woman in the ninth month of pregnancy
cannot work." 198
192 Id. at 343-45, 174 A.2d at 254-55. The New Jersey statute under which this case was
decided, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 43:21-5(a) (West 1962 & Supp. 1987), was later amended to restrict
"good cause" to that directly attributable to the employer. Act approved June 3, 1961, cl. 43,
1961 N.J. Laws 416, 423.
In Mississippi, the statute expressly states that marital and domestic circumstances do not
constitute good cause for leaving. Miss. Code Ann. § 71-5-513 A(l) (1987). Although judicial
interpretations of this statute have made it clear that pregnancy falls within marital and do-
mestic circumstances, see, e.g., Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Corley, 246 Miss. 43,
148 So. 2d 715 (1963); Franklin v. Mississippi Employment Sec. Comm'n., 254 Miss. 447, 136
So. 2d 197 (1961); Luke v. Mississippi Employment See. Comm'n., 239 Miss. 292, 123 So. 2d
231 (1960), a 1986 amendment to the law expressly excludes pregnancy from this category.
Act approved Mar. 13, 1986, ch. 316, § 2, 1986 Miss. Laws 23, 23.
193 51 Pa. Commw. 26, 413 A.2d 782 (1980).
194 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 802(6) (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1987).
195 51 Pa. Commw. at 29-30, 413 A.2d at 783.
196 Id. at 30-31, 413 A.2d at 784.
197 Id. at 31, 413 A.2d at 784.
198 Id. at 30, 413 A.2d at 784. The claimant had originally been turned down for benefits on
the ground that she was unavailable for work. At her hearing before the referee, the claimant
contended that she was in fact available for part-time work. Id. at 28-29, 413 A.2d at 783.
The referee determined that she was still ineligible because she had left work voluntarily with-
out good cause. Id. at 29, 413 A.2d at 783. This is another example of the confusion between
the eligibility criteria and the disqualifying conditions, which in this case appears in the Penn-
sylvania statute. Section 801(d) of the statute requires that a claimant be "able" and "avail-
able" for suitable work to avoid disqualification, while section 802(b) states that a claimant
who leaves work without compelling cause is "ineligible" to receive benefits. 43 Pa. Cons. Stat.
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The compelling and necessitous circumstances language also ap-
pears in the Massachusetts statute's definition of "involuntary" unem-
ployment. 199  In Dohoney v. Director of Division of Employment
Security,200 the court noted that while pregnancy may in fact be a com-
pelling personal circumstance, a claimant still must prove that pregnancy
was in fact the cause of her leaving her employment.20' In this case, the
court determined that the actual cause of claimant's termination was that
she had failed to make the appropriate efforts to preserve her job, such as
requesting a leave of absence.20 2 The court reasoned that
not every "urgent, compelling and necessitous" absence requires termi-
nation. Normally, a worker who anticipates a legitimate absence from
work can take steps to preserve her employment. When a worker fails
to take such steps and severance results, it is the worker's own inaction
rather than compelling personal reasons that cause the leaving.203
The Dohoney case construed a Massachusetts statute that disquali-
fies employees who left their jobs "voluntarily without good cause attrib-
utable to the employing unit."' 204 The statute provides, however, that an
employee will not be disqualified if "his reasons for leaving were for such
an urgent, compelling and necessitous nature as to make his separation
involuntary. ' 20 5 As discussed in Director of Division of Employment Se-
curity v. Fitzgerald,20 6 this statute thus contains "dual conditions of dis-
qualification"-a cause which is not attributable to the employer and
voluntariness-both of which must be met before an individual can be
denied benefits. 20 7 In Fitzgerald, a pregnant welder terminated her em-
ployment when no lighter work was available for her.20 8 The court
found that the "employee was not unreasonable in deciding to abandon
§§ 801-02 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1987).
199 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151A, § 25(e) (West Supp. 1987). The Massachusetts law
also restricts good cause to that attributable to the employer, but it allows a claimant who left
under "urgent, compelling and necessitous" circumstances to receive benefits by deeming sepa-
ration from employment in these circumstances "involuntary." Id.; see text accompanying
notes 203-11 infra.
200 377 Mass. 333, 386 N.E.2d 10 (1979).
201 Id. at 335-36, 386 N.E.2d at 13.
202 See id. at 338, 386 N.E.2d at 14.
203 Id. at 336, 386 N.E.2d at 13. For a discussion of the requirement that an employee
request a leave of absence, see text accompanying notes 25 1-69 infra. The Dohoney court was
unpersuaded by the claimant's contention that the repeal of a statute delineating a statutory
period of ineligibility for benefits during the eight weeks surrounding the birth of a child meant
that all women who left work due to pregnancy were now qualified for unemployment com-
pensation. 377 Mass. at 337, 386 N.E.2d at 13-14. The court characterized the statutory
period and the voluntariness question as "distinct" issues. Id. at 337, 386 N.E.2d at 14.
204 Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 151A, § 25(e) (West Supp. 1987).
205 Id.
206 382 Mass. 159, 414 N.E.2d 608 (1980).
207 Id. at 161, 414 N.E.2d at 610.
208 Id. at 159-60, 414 N.E.2d at 609.
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her regular job by the reason of her pregnancy, 20 9 and observed that
"pregnancy... may be a compelling personal circumstance not unlike
other disabilities that legitimately require absence from work, neither of
which condition is viewed as causing a 'voluntary' departure from
work." 210 Since the pregnant individual's departure from her job was
deemed to be involuntary, one of the dual conditions of disqualification
had not been met and thus she qualified for benefits. 211
(iv) Leaving with a ' good cause attributable to the employer. " The
question of dual conditions has arisen in many states that have adopted
statutes requiring an employee to have left work "voluntarily with good
cause attributable to the employer" in order to be eligible for benefits.
While this is a restrictive formulation, some courts have used a dual con-
ditions approach to broaden the limited application of provisions requir-
ing an employee's termination of employment to be causally connected to
her employment. For example, in Gibson v. Rutledge,212 the court re-
fused to disqualify an individual who left work for several months (and
had been replaced) after sustaining a back injury while performing his
job.2 13 Despite the work-related nature of the injury, the state unemploy-
ment commission determined that the employee's reason for leaving did
not meet the extremely narrow condition of "voluntarily without good
cause involving fault on the part of the employer. ' 21 4 However, the
court determined that the individual had left work involuntarily and thus
was entitled to benefits.215 The court noted that under the statutory pro-
vision requiring an unemployed individual to accept available suitable
work, an individual cannot be forced to accept work that would involve a
significant risk to her health, safety, and morals.216 It would be strik-
ingly inconsistent, the court reasoned, to disqualify from the receipt of
unemployment benefits an individual who has been forced to leave work
for the same reasons.217 The court concluded as follows: "In order to
remove this inconsistency, we must hold that when an employee is forced
209 Id. at 161, 414 N.E.2d at 610.
210 Id. at 161 n.6, 414 N.E.2d at 610 n.6.
211 See id. at 161-62, 414 N.E.2d at 610-11.
212 298 S.E.2d 137 (W. Va. 1982) (discussed at note 170 supra).
213 Id. at 139, 141.
214 Id. at 141 (citing W. Va. Code § 21A-6-3(1) (1978)).
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. The same reasoning was used in Fannon v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 219 Minn. 306,
314, 18 N.W.2d 249, 252 (1945). See text accompanying notes 165-67 supra, note 227 infra.
This concept has been integrated into some unemployment statutes, such as that of Arkansas,
which requires consideration of health and safety risks in determinations of both suitable work
and good cause for termination. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 11-10-513 (1987).
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to quit his job for a health problem, he has not done so voluntarily. '218
Focusing on the voluntariness condition, the Gibson court broadened the
application of the West Virginia statute to include any health-related sit-
uation, apparently even those not directly attributable to the claimant's
employer or work. Under the Gibson court's analysis, a termination due
to pregnancy would not disqualify an individual from receiving unem-
ployment benefits.
The dual conditions approach was rejected by the Missouri Court of
Appeals in Duffy v. Labor & Industrial Relations Commission,219 as "a
judicial abrogation of the specific provisions of [the state's unemploy-
ment compensation law]."'220 Following its earlier decision in Bussmann
Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Commission,221 the Missouri court re-
fused to read the statutory provision-"voluntarily without good cause
attributable to his work or to his employer"-as imposing two condi-
tions, both of which had to be met in order for disqualification to oc-
cur.222  Stating that focusing on the voluntariness provision
independently would "render superfluous" the other words of the statute,
the Duffy court affirmed the denial of benefits to a claimant who had left
her employment due to a personal illness unrelated to her employ-
ment. 223 The Bussman court, using the same reasoning, had disqualified
a pregnant employee, finding that her termination in order to give birth
to her child had no causal connection with her work or her employer.224
In the absence of a dual conditions interpretation, pregnancy is typi-
cally treated like other illnesses in the application of statutory provisions
requiring "good cause attributable to the employer. ' 225 Unless otherwise
provided in the statute,226 some courts have held that an illness meets the
218 Gibson, 298 S.E.2d at 141. The Gibson case overruled the portion of an earlier decision,
State v. Hix, 132 W. Va. 516, 54 S.E.2d 198 (1949), discussed at text accompanying notes 168-
70 supra, that had held that an individual who ceases work due to illness, fear of illness, or any
other cause not involving fault on the part of the employee is disqualified from receiving bene-
fits under the state statute. Gibson, 298 S.E.2d at 142.
219 556 S.W.2d 195 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
220 Id. at 198.
221 335 S.W.2d 456 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
222 Duffy, 556 S.W.2d at 198.
223 Id.
224 Bussman, 335 S.W.2d at 461; see also Davis v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 554
S.W.2d 541 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (court upheld disqualification of pregnant employee who
terminated employment after she was denied maternity leave due to her poor work record).
225 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has determined that the denial of un-
employment benefits to pregnant or formerly pregnant women may violate Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982), if a state unemployment
agency treats pregnant or formerly pregnant women differently from the way it treats other
medically disabled persons. EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 626.11, at 69 (July 1986).
226 See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 443.101(1)(a) (1985) (defining such cause as including "illness or
disability of the individual requiring separation from his employment"); Iowa Code
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limitations of these provisions only if it is caused, not just aggravated, by
the employment.227 As shown by the decision of the Iowa Supreme
Court in Moulton v. Iowa Employment Security Commission,228 preg-
nancy is not directly attributable to one's employment and therefore is
not "good cause" for termination under this theory. 229 The same result
was reached in Brooks v. District of Columbia Department of Employ-
ment Services,230 in which a pregnant security guard was denied unem-
ployment benefits when she terminated employment because the belt she
was required to wear pressed on her stomach and made her sick.231 The
Brooks court concluded that "[tihere was nothing in the work itself
which gave her cause for leaving. Nothing in the record suggests that
her resignation was other than voluntary, and it cannot be argued that
pregnancy is a work-related illness. '232
Other courts, however, have construed "good cause attributable to
the employer" to include illness aggravated by employment, even if not
directly caused by it.233 Following this theory, pregnancy may in fact
constitute good cause for termination. For example, in South Central
Bell Telephone Co. v. Gerace,234 a pregnant employee who was advised by
her physician that, due to related health problems, she should not drive
the long distance to and from work, was found by the Louisiana Court of
Appeals to have terminated employment with good cause connected with
her employment. 235
The Louisiana disqualification statute requiring good cause attrib-
utable to the employer 236 has been the focus of several cases applying the
statute to pregnant women. First, in Algiers Homestead Association v.
§ 96.5(1)(d) (1987) (providing that employee shall not be deemed to have left employment
voluntarily without good cause attributable to employer if employee left due to illness, injury,
or pregnancy upon doctor's orders, with employer's consent, and attempted to return to same
job upon recovery). The Iowa statute is discussed in Area Residential Care, Inc., v. Iowa
Dep't of Job Serv., 323 N.W.2d 257, 258 (Iowa 1982).
227 See, e.g., Oxford v. Daniels, 2 Ark. App. 200, 618 S.W.2d 171 (1981) (benefits allowed to
individual who terminated employment after transfer to different machine caused various
physical infirmities); Fannon v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 219 Minn. 306, 18 N.W.2d 249
(1945) (benefits allowed to employee who developed allergy to substances with which she
worked).
228 239 Iowa 1161, 34 N.W.2d 211 (1948); see also Shontz v. Iowa Employment Sec.
Comm'n, 248 N.W.2d 88, 91 (Iowa 1976) (discussing Moulton).
229 239 Iowa at 1165, 34 N.W.2d at 213.
230 453 A.2d 812 (D.C. 1982).
231 Id.
232 Id. at 813.
233 See, e.g., Department of Indus. Relations v. Henry, 42 Ala. App. 573, 172 So. 2d 374
(1964) (benefits allowed to claimant who left work when lifting and other physical exertion
aggravated his conditions).
234 394 So. 2d 657 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
235 Id. at 658.
236 La. Rev. Stat. § 23:1601 (West 1985).
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Brown,237 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that a pregnant woman
who left work after she developed pregnancy-related illnesses was dis-
qualified from receiving unemployment benefits because the cause of her
termination "was in no way connected with her employment. '238 An
exception to this ruling was made in Southern Bell Telephone & Tele-
graph Co. v. Administrator, Division of Employment Security,'2 39 which
permitted the conferral of benefits upon an employee who was required
to take a maternity leave of absence under a collective bargaining agree-
ment.2 40 In response, the Louisiana legislature "decided it would be un-
fair to pay benefits only to those women employees covered by such
agreements. Hence, it adopted [an amendment to the statute] whch [sic]
makes benefits available to all women employees who cease work because
of pregnancy, whether they do so under a contract or otherwise. '241
Under this amended statute, in King v. Louisiana Department of Employ-
ment Security,242 a woman was allowed unemployment benefits when she
found her old job unavailable due to an economic slowdown when she
returned after her pregnancy. In 1977, the legislature repealed the excep-
tion relating to pregnancy, and the qualification condition again became
that applied in Algiers Homestead.243
Most recently, in Martin Mills, Inc. v. Department of Employment
Security,244 the court further restricted the rights of pregnant women
when it held "that a female employee is disqualified for unemployment
benefits as a matter of law for the duration of a leave of absence volunta-
rily requested by her and granted by her employer because she is preg-
nant, for the reason that such condition is not connected with her
employment. ' 245 The claimant had requested a leave of absence, but
then was told by her doctor that she could do light work.246 The em-
ployer offered to allow her to return to the same job, but had no other,
lighter work available. 247 The court, swayed by the fact that her em-
ployer had offered her work which she refused, declared her to be dis-
qualified for benefits. 248 The court distinguished the case before it from
237 246 La. 738, 167 So. 2d 349 (1964).
238 Id. at 743, 167 So. 2d at 351.
239 252 La. 519, 211 So. 2d 634 (1968).
240 Id. at 519, 211 So. 2d at 634.
241 King v. Louisiana Dep't of Employment See., 229 So. 2d 387, 389 (La. Ct. App. 1969);
see La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23:1601(6) (West 1964) (repealed 1977).
242 229 So. 2d 387 (La. Ct. App. 1969).
243 See South Central Bell Co. v. Department of Employment Sec., 389 So. 2d 790, 791 (La.
Ct. App. 1980).
244 391 So. 2d 56 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
245 Id. at 59.
246 Id. at 57.
247 Id. at 59.
248 See id.
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earlier cases where women had sought unsuccessfully to be rehired after
the termination of their leaves of absence.249 The court could have more
easily distinguished those earlier cases by noting that all of them had
been decided when the statutory amendment relating to pregnancy was
in effect. 250
Even in those states which have construed the requirements of an
"involuntary" leaving and "good cause attributable to the employer" so
broadly as to allow unemployment benefits to women who leave work
due to pregnancy, the employee typically must show that she did not
intend to abandon the labor force when she left to give birth. In Gilooly
v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 251 a
pregnant employee trained a replacement, did not request a leave of ab-
sence, and told her employer that she did not intend to work for at least
six months after her child was born. 252 When she asked to be reinstated
in a part-time position less than two months after delivering her baby and
found that no positions were available, she applied for unemployment
benefits.253 She was denied benefits, even though Pennsylvania courts
considered pregnancy a necessitous and compelling cause which made
leaving work "involuntary. '254 Benefits were denied because the em-
ployee had not in any way manifested an intention to remain in the work
force.255 Citing Flannick v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Re-
view, 25 6 the court noted that, in the case of a temporary disability, the
employee must indicate in some way an intent to return to work, particu-
larly "where the leaving is an equivocal act, as where a pregnant woman
leaves her employment and the leaving can be construed either as a tem-
porary absence or an abandonment of the labor force. '257
The same reasoning was used by a North Carolina court as the basis
for denying unemployment benefits in Sellers v. National Spinning Co..258
In this case, the claimant took a one month medical leave of absence
early in her pregnancy, but neither returned to work nor requested an
249 Id.
250 See text accompanying note 243 supra.
251 76 Pa. Commw. 20, 462 A.2d 958 (1983).
252 Id. at 21, 462 A.2d at 959.
253 Id. at 21-22, 462 A.2d at 959.
254 See text accompanying notes 163-64 supra.
255 Gilooly, 76 Pa. Commw. at 23, 462 A.2d at 959.
256 168 Pa. Super. 606, 82 A.2d 671 (1951); see text accompanying notes 181-88 supra.
257 Gilooly, 76 Pa. Commw. at 23, 462 A.2d at 959 (citing Flannick, 168 Pa. Super. at 610,
82 A.2d at 673). Pennsylvania has also applied this rule in other cases of temporary disability.
See Benitez v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 73 Pa. Commw. 241, 458 A.2d
619 (1983) (employee who left work to go into hospital, never requested leave of absence, and
never contacted employer, denied benefits on ground that his termination was "voluntary").
258 64 N.C. App. 567, 307 S.E.2d 774 (1983), review denied, 310 N.C. 153, 311 S.E.2d 293
(1984).
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extension when the one month period expired. 259 Agreeing that accep-
tance of a maternity leave is not a "voluntary" termination, 26° the court
nevertheless found that benefits should be denied since the claimant had
not even taken "the necessary minimal steps to preserve the employment
relationship. ' 261 In Dohoney v. Director of Division of Employment Se-
curity,262 a pregnant bank employee left to have her baby without indi-
cating either a desire to return or a time she planned to return. 263 She
even declined her former position when she again became available for
work.2 64 The court affirmed her disqualification, stating that it did not
believe that "the Legislature intended that a claimant who failed to take
steps to preserve her job should be paid unemployment benefits." 265
Some states have incorporated the concept of manifesting an intent
not to abandon the workforce into the disqualification provisions of their
unemployment compensation laws. For example, the Iowa statute pro-
vides that a claimant will not be disqualified on the ground of voluntarily
leaving previous employment without good cause attributable to the em-
ployer if the individual left upon doctor's orders, notified the employer,
and, upon recovery, returned to the employer and offered to perform the
same or comparable services. 266 A claimant must carefully follow these
statutory procedures in order to avoid disqualification. For example, in
Butts v. Iowa Department of Job Services,267 an individual left her em-
ployment when 51/2 months pregnant and sought to return to work a
month after the child was born.268 Her request for unemployment bene-
fits was denied because of her failure to submit the doctor's certificates,
both before her leave and after her recovery, as required by the statute. 269
259 Id. at 568, 307 S.E.2d at 775.
260 Id. at 570, 207 S.E.2d at 776. The court cited Brown v. Porcher, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983), as authority for this position. See text accompany-
ing notes 341-45 infra.
261 Sellers, 64 N.C. App. at 570, 307 S.E.2d at 776.
262 377 Mass. 333, 386 N.E.2d 10 (1979); see text accompanying notes 200-03 supra.
263 377 Mass. at 334, 386 N.E.2d at 12.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 336, 386 N.E.2d at 13.
266 Iowa Code Ann. § 96.5(1)(d) (West 1984).
267 328 N.W.2d 515 (Iowa 1983).
268 Id. at 516.
269 Id. at 516-17; see Iowa Code Ann. § 96.5(1)(d) (1984). The court seems to have been
confused about the time for which benefits were requested. The court notes at one point that
the only dispute was over the denial of benefits during the time the claimant was pregnant and
recovering from the birth. Butts, 328 N.W.2d at 516. When her job was unavailable upon her
request for reinstatement, the state unemployment agency began paying benefits, ruling that
"she had then met the requalifying factors under [the statute]." Id. Yet later the court speaks
of her actions after recovery (not submitting the required certification of recovery and waiting
too long before offering her services again) as two of the three factors which were the basis for
the denial. Id. at 517.
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In some of the cases described immediately above, the taking of a
leave of absence constituted "leaving" employment, and this leaving was
treated as either voluntary or involuntary. Other cases take a somewhat
different approach, treating the employee on leave as still employed until
the time she returns from the leave and finds her position no longer avail-
able.270 Under this theory, the individual's unemployment can be
thought of as due to a condition other than pregnancy that is involun-
tary, and that may be directly attributable to the employer. For example,
in Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Division of Employment
Security,271 an employee took a maternity leave of absence and was told
upon her request to return that no openings in her status were avail-
able.272 The court found that there was no termination of employment
during her leave, stating:
[T]he fundamental and underlying cause of [her] unemployment fol-
lowing her application for reinstatement was not her prior condition of
pregnancy but the then existing unavailability of work on the part of
the employer, and it was only at this time that she "left (her) employ-
ment" and accordingly, such leave was for "good cause connected with
her employment. '273
Quoting Southern Bell, the Supreme Court of Mississippi, in Smith v.
Mississippi Employment Security Commission,274 found that a pregnant
employee whose job was terminated while she was on maternity leave
had only "temporarily suspended" her employment during the leave.275
She actually lost her job because of a reduction in her employer's work
force, and thus was not disqualified from receiving benefits. 276 This the-
ory has also been followed by Florida courts.277
The Missouri Court of Appeals adopted this theory in Trail v. In-
dustrial Commission,278 a case in which a pregnant employee had been
270 As discussed in note 358 infra, it is not uncommon for an employee to be granted a
"leave of absence" that does not include any guarantee of job reinstatement.
271 252 La. 519, 211 So. 2d 634 (1968).
272 Id. at 520-21, 211 So. 2d at 634-35.
273 Id. at 526, 211 So. 2d at 636. Compare this characterization of the "cause" for the
claimant's unemployment with that in Dohoney v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 377
Mass. 333, 386 N.E.2d 10 (1979), in which the employee's failure to request a leave of absence
was deemed to be the "cause" of her unemployment.
274 344 So. 2d 137 (Miss. 1977).
275 Id. at 139.
276 Id. at 140; see also Whitehead v. Mississippi Employment See. Comm'n, 349 So. 2d
1048 (Miss. 1977) (employee's termination caused not by maternity leave, but by bankruptcy
of employer).
277 See Swavely v. Industrial Relations Comm'n, 345 So. 2d 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977);
Fisher v. State of Fla. Dep't of Commerce, Div. of Employment Sec., 333 So. 2d 513 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Robinson v. Industrial Relations Comm'n, 329 So. 2d 401 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976).
278 540 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
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granted a leave of absence but had received no assurance that she would
be reemployed at the end of her leave.279 Relying on the California case
of Lewis v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board,280 which
was concerned with a leave of absence for personal reasons unrelated to
pregnancy, the Trail court concluded that the employer effectively laid
off the employee by being unable to rehire her, and, "as a result, her
unemployment was caused not by her own fault for having taken the
voluntary leave of absence but by the fact that the employer had no job
available. ' 281 This holding was contrary to previous Missouri cases, par-
ticularly Neeley v. Division of Employment Security.2s2 In Neeley, an em-
ployee who had been granted a maternity leave with no guarantee of job
reinstatement was found to be disqualified for the purposes of unemploy-
ment benefits when she attempted unsuccessfully to regain her job prior
to the expiration of the leave.28 3 The Missouri Court of Appeals endeav-
ored to reconcile these contrary holdings in Division of Employment Se-
curity v. Labor & Industrial Relations Commission,28 4 in which it denied
benefits to a woman who had been put on a personal leave of absence so
that she might care for her ailing spouse.28 5 Noting the Trail court's
reliance on Lewis, the court in Division of Employment Security pointed
out that Lewis had distinguished between a "termination with condi-
tional rehire" and a "true leave of absence"-which includes a reemploy-
ment guarantee-granting unemployment benefits only in the latter
case.286 The court found this distinction to constitute a "sound ap-
proach" and used it to resolve the case before it.287 In attempting to
explain the fact that the employee in Trail had gone on leave with no
reemployment guarantee, and thus did not take a "true leave of absence,"
the Division of Employment Security court concluded somewhat weakly:
[T]his court must find that the court in Trail concluded that the leave
agreement contemplated that any rehiring would be at the same job
and not just any job. This has to be the result in order for the rationale
in Lewis to be applicable and relied upon by the court in Trail.28 8
279 Id. at 182-83.
280 56 Cal. App. 3d 729, 128 Cal. Rptr. 795 (1976).
281 Trail, 540 S.W.2d at 183.
282 379 S.W.2d 201 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
283 Id.
284 617 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
285 See id. at 622, 628.
286 Id. at 626-27 (citing Lewis, 56 Cal. App. 3d at 737, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 803).
287 Id. at 627.
288 Id. The Missouri Court of Appeals examined this line of cases again in Wimberly v.
Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, No. WD 34909 (Mo. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 1984), but con-
cluded that the enactment of FUTA section 3304(a)(12), 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) (1982), and
the decision by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Brown v. Porcher, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983), should alter the state's traditional analysis of
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It is important to note that although the characterization of a leave
of absence as a temporary suspension rather than a termination of em-
ployment may serve to broaden the circumstances under which a preg-
nant or formerly pregnant employee may be qualified for benefits, this
same characterization may narrow the circumstances under which a
woman on maternity leave may be eligible for benefits.2 89 For example, if
a pregnant woman whose job involves heavy lifting takes a maternity
leave when no alternative work is available, she may in fact be physically
able to do lighter work, and thus eligible for unemployment benefits if
she is unsuccessful in finding such work. However, if the leave is deemed
to be merely a suspension of employment, she is technically not unem-
ployed, and thus not eligible to receive unemployment benefits. A varia-
tion on this argument was used by the court in Lauderale v. Division of
Employment Security290 as the basis for denying benefits to a stock clerk
on maternity leave. The clerk left when four months pregnant under an
agreement with her employer that she could return to the same job after
her child was born.29 1 During the early part of the leave she sought
lighter work from other employers, and applied for unemployment bene-
fits when unable to find such work. 292 The court found that she was
ineligible for benefits during this time-that is, not "able and available"
for work-"since by accepting the leave of absence she limited her avail-
ability for work because ... her intention to return to her regular job,
which her employer admittedly was holding for her, after the birth of her
child limited her employment opportunities. '2 93
On the other hand, some courts have taken a less rigid approach to
the question of whether an individual on a leave of absence is "unem-
ployed" for eligibility purposes. In Pennsylvania it is "well established"
that" 'it may not be presumed as a matter of law that a person on a leave
of absence from his previous job is unavailable for work. It follows...
that a woman may not be presumed unavailable for work, simply because
she was placed on a pregnancy leave of absence'. '294 In Pennsylvania
maternity leaves of absence. This decision was reversed by the Missouri Supreme Court.
Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 688 S.W.2d 344 (1985). The Missouri
Supreme Court's decision was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. Wimberly v.
Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511 (1987), which did not mention the Neeley,
Trail, or Division of Employment Security cases.
289 See text accompanying notes 123-38 supra.
290 605 S.W.2d 174, 178 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); see text accompanying notes 103-09 supra.
291 Id. at 175-76.
292 Id. at 176.
293 Id. at 178. The court did not discuss the relationship between this holding and the
holding in the case of Trail v. Industrial Comm'n, that a leave of absence is merely a suspen-
sion of employment. 540 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
294 Pennsylvania Elec. Co. v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Re-
view, 69 Pa. Commw. 214, 218, 450 A.2d 779, 781 (1982) (quoting Wincek v. Unemployment
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Electric Co. v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review, 295 a pregnant woman on leave was considered eligible for unem-
ployment benefits even though her employer-provided life insurance and
hospital coverage continued during her leave.296 The court looked to the
Pennsylvania statute's definition of the term "unemployed," 297 and deter-
mined that the claimant met the statutory criteria in that she had not
performed any services for, nor received any remuneration from, the em-
ployer. 298 Under a similarly worded statute,299 the District Court of Ap-
peal of Florida, in General Telephone Co. v. Board of Review, 3 ° found
that an employee who took leave in her seventh month of pregnancy was
technically "unemployed. ' 301
It would not, perhaps, be inconsistent for a state to view a leave of
absence as "unemployment" for eligibility purposes, but as a suspension
of employment for disqualification purposes. There are jobs that a
woman may be unable to perform while she is pregnant, forcing her to
discontinue performing services for, and receiving pay from, her current
employer, and thus be technically unemployed. During portions of the
leave, however, she could well be ready, willing, and able to perform
lighter work for another employer, making her eligible for unemploy-
ment benefits if she searched in good faith, but was unable to find such
work. To deny unemployment benefits to a pregnant or formerly preg-
nant woman in such a situation would not only amount to a presumption
that pregnant women are unable to work, but also that an employee who
is unable to work in one job is unable to work in any job. If the woman
applies for reinstatement with her previous employer, again, in good
faith, after recovering from the birth, but finds no positions available, it
would not seem to abrogate the purpose of the unemployment compensa-
tion law30 2 to allow her to qualify for benefits on the ground that her
employer was unable to provide a position that was promised.
Perhaps all that can be said to summarize the two preceeding sub-
sections is that courts in different jurisdictions and, sometimes, courts
within the same jurisdiction, have differed in interpreting identical or
Compensation Bd. of Review, 50 Pa. Commw. 237, 239, 412 A.2d 699, 701 (1980)).
295 Id.
296 Id. at 219-20, 450 A.2d at 782.
297 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 753(u) (Purdon 1964).
298 Pennsylvania Elec., 69 Pa. Commw. at 219, 450 A.2d at 782.
299 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 443.06(1) (West 1975).
300 356 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
301 Id. at 1359. However, the court found the individual disqualified from receiving benefits
under a statute that defined "good cause" for leaving as cause attributable to the employer or
to an illness other than pregnancy, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 443.06(a) (West 1975). Id.
302 This purpose is to support persons who are genuinely attached to the labor market, but
temporarily unemployed through no fault of their own. See text accompanying notes 48-51
supra.
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similar statutory language. Therefore, it is difficult to make generaliza-
tions as to what circumstances will make a claimant ineligible for or dis-
qualified from the receipt of unemployment benefits, even when the
statutory requirements are the same.
3. Cases Challenging the Validity of Statutes Which Deny
Unemployment Benefits to Pregnant or Formerly Pregnant
Women
Even prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Turner v. Department of Employment Security,303 courts had begun to
examine the constitutionality of state statutes which denied pregnant or
formerly pregnant women unemployment benefits. In Miller v. Indus-
trial Commission,30 4 a Colorado statute which provided only a limited
"special award" of unemployment benefits for workers who had sepa-
rated from a job due to pregnancy 30 5 was challenged as an unreasonable
discrimination against women. The court concluded, however, that this
classification and particular treatment of pregnant workers was not a
classification that discriminated based upon gender alone. 30 6 Three years
after Miller, the Supreme Court of Washington held in Hanson v. Hutt 30 7
that a statute providing that a woman who voluntarily quits work be-
cause of pregnancy308 will be presumed unable to work was unconstitu-
tional.30 9 In reaching this conclusion, which was opposite to that of the
303 423 U.S. 44 (1975).
304 173 Colo. 476, 480 P.2d 565 (1971).
305 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 82-4-8(8)(f) (Supp. 1965) (repealed 1984).
306 173 Colo. at 483, 480 P.2d at 568. But see Sylvara v. Industrial Comm'n, 191 Colo. 92,
550 P.2d 868 (1976) (striking down statute in question). The United States Supreme Court
reached a conclusion similar to that in Miller in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), where
the Court examined a decision of the State of California not to insure pregnancy under its
disability insurance system. The Court noted that the system divided employees into two
groups, but that those groups did not divide along gender lines. See id. at 496 n.20. Rather,
the system divided workers into pregnant women and nonpregnant persons (including both
men and women), and thus was not unlawful gender discrimination in violation of the equal
protection clause. See id. at 497 n.20. Two years later, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125 (1976), decided under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1982), the Supreme Court, following Geduldig, confirmed that classifications based
on pregnancy were not to be deemed gender-based classifications. Id. at 133-35. As noted by
one commentator, criticism of the conclusions reached by the Court in these decisions has
since become a cottage industry. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 955, 983 (1984) (citing some two dozen law review articles criticizing Geduldig). In 1978,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
which made clear that discrimination "because of sex" included discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076,
2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)).
307 83 Wash. 195, 517 P.2d 599 (1974).
308 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 50.20.030 (1962) (repealed 1975).
309 83 Wash. at 202, 517 P.2d at 603.
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Miller court, the Washington Supreme Court stated:
While it is overly simplistic, it is true that only women become
pregnant. It is equally clear that only women must remain barren to
be eligible for and to receive unemployment compensation. This re-
quirement of [the Washington statute] not only applies to only one sex
but places a heavier burden upon women who seek unemployment
benefits. We hold that the statute discriminates against women on the
basis of sex. 3 10
The court went on to examine the standard by which the Washing-
ton statute should be judged. After analyzing the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Frontiero v. Richardson,311 the court decided
that the Washington statute was inherently suspect and should be subject
to strict judicial scrutiny.3 12
The State of Washington had asserted three justifications for the
statutory classification based upon pregnancy. The first justification was
that pregnant women are not genuinely attached to the labor market.313
The court noted, however, the testimony of five doctors at the initial un-
employment hearing for the claimant to the effect that ninety percent of
pregnant women are able to continue working in their normal occupation
310 Id. at 198, 517 P.2d at 601-02.
311 411 U.S. 677 (1973). In Frontiero, the Court struck down a federal statute that automat-
ically deemed spouses of male servicemen "dependents" for purposes of certain employee bene-
fits, while simultaneously requiring female members of the Armed Forces to prove the
dependency status of their spouses. Id. at 688. The Court found that this statute resulted in a
denial of the due process rights of the women members. Id. at 690-91. Justices Brennan,
Douglas, White, and Marshall concluded that classifications based on sex are inherently sus-
pect, and thus subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Id. at 682 (plurality opinion). Justices Powell,
Burger, and Blackmun felt it was inappropriate to decide at that time whether sex was a sus-
pect classification. Id. at 691 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
312 Hanson, 83 Wash. at 201, 517 P.2d at 603. The Hanson court characterized the ap-
proaches of the different Justices in Frontiero to the question of the proper level of scrutiny as
follows:
In Frontiero, four justices expressly found that "classifications based upon sex...
are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny." They
found "at least implicit support for such an approach" in Reed v. Reed [404 U.S. 71
(1971)]. Mr. Justice Stewart concurred in the Frontiero judgment, agreeing that the
statutes in question worked an invidious discrimination. Three other justices agreed that
the statute constituted an unconstitutional discrimination against service women. They
did not feel, however, that it was necessary or proper to hold that classifications based
upon sex are inherently suspect. They reasoned that since the Equal Rights Amendment
is presently before the various state legislatures for adoption, the Supreme Court should
defer categorizing sex classifications as suspect, pending an expression of the will of the
people.
83 Wash. at 200, 517 P.2d at 602-03 (quoting Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 688). In cases after Fron-
tiero, the Supreme Court has applied an intermediate standard of review to gender classifica-
tions, requiring that a gender-specific law bear a substantial relationship to an important
governmental objective. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-200 (1976).
313 Hanson, 83 Wash. at 201, 517 P.2d at 603.
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between five days and four weeks after delivery of their children. 314
Based on this testimony, the court concluded that there was ample evi-
dence that pregnant women were in fact attached to the labor market.315
The state next asserted that employers may be reluctant to hire
women who are in the later stages of pregnancy.316 The court pointed
out, however, that the statute itself sets forth conditions by which claim-
ants are to become eligible for unemployment compensation. 317 The
court noted that none of these statutory conditions referred to the atti-
tudes of employers with regard to the hiring of a certain class of
employees. 31 8
Finally, the court turned to the state's argument that pregnant
women voluntarily caused or contributed to their unemployment by be-
coming pregnant. 319 The court's response to this argument was as fol-
lows: "Assuming arguendo that pregnancy is voluntary, this does not
mean that unemployment resulting therefrom is necessarily voluntary.
While a woman may wish to become pregnant, she may not, and often
does not wish to become unemployed as a result thereof. ' 320 The court
went on to conclude that there was no compelling state interest which
justified the statute's discriminatory division.321 Consequently, the stat-
ute violated the equal protection clause of the United States
Constitution.3 22
The United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of
statutes that delineate an express period during which pregnant women
are deemed ineligible for unemployment benefits in Turner v. Department
of Employment Security.323 The Utah statute at issue provided that a
pregnant woman was ineligible to receive unemployment benefits for the
period between twelve weeks before and six weeks after childbirth.324
The Court contrasted this "blanket disqualification" with another Utah
statute which provided a more "individualized determination of ineligi-
bility. ' 325 Under the second statute, a woman could not receive unem-
ployment benefits "during any week of unemployment when it is found







320 Id. at 201-02, 517 P.2d at 603.
321 Id. at 202, 517 P.2d at 603.
322 Id.
323 423 U.S. 44 (1975) (per curiam).
324 Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-5(h)(1) (1974).
325 423 U.S. at 45.
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nancy. ' 326 Relying on its earlier decision in Cleveland Board of Educa-
tion v. LaFleur,32-7 the Court held that the "Fourteenth Amendment
requires that unemployment compensation boards no less than school
boards must achieve legitimate state ends through more individualized
means when basic human liberties are at stake. ' 328 Therefore, the Utah
statute's "conclusive presumption of incapacity" 329 was constitutionally
invalid. 330
326 Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-5(h)(2) (1974).
327 414 U.S. 632 (1974). In LaFleur, the Supreme Court declared that a school policy that
required teachers to take a mandatory leave of absence after the fourth or fifth month of preg-
nancy violated a person's freedom of choice regarding family life, as protected by the due
process clause of the United States Constitution. Id. at 643-48. Significantly, the Supreme
Court in LaFleur did not address the question of whether a classification based on pregnancy is
a sex-based classification. LaFleur was a consolidation of two cases; these reflected the differ-
ent opinions of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits on the sex-based classification issue. Compare
LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972) (discrimination based on
pregnancy was sex-based discrimination) with Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 474
F.2d 395, 398 (4th Cir. 1973) (discrimination based on pregnancy not sex-based discrimina-
tion). See generally Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 Berkeley
Women's L.J. 1, 3-5 (1985) (developing new "episodic analysis" approach to "conceptualizing
the legal significance of biological reproductive conduct"). It was not until the Court's deci-
sion five months later in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), that the Court answered the
sex-based classification question. See note 306 supra.
328 Turner, 423 U.S. at 46.
329 The LaFleur case and, consequently, the Turner case, were both decided on due process,
rather than equal protection, grounds. The Court in LaFleur focused on the fact that a con-
clusive, or irrebuttable, presumption of incapacity violated a pregnant woman's due process
rights because of its conclusiveness. See 414 U.S. at 644-48. Subsequent decisions relied on
this analysis until the Court decided Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1978). The Salfi case
involved a widow who was denied social security benefits under the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 416(c) (1982). Id. at 753-54. The Act imposed a mandatory nine month duration-of-
the-marriage period before commencement of benefit eligibility, 42 U.S.C. § 416(c) (1982), in
order to avoid so-called sham marriages. See id. at 754 n.2. Mrs. Salfi's husband died unex-
pectedly after less than six months of marriage. Id. at 753. Mrs. Salfi complained that the
arbitrary waiting period in the Act violated her constitutional rights. See id. at 755. The lower
court agreed with Mrs. Salfi, relying on LaFleur, as well as certain other cases. Id. at 755-56.
The Supreme Court reversed and explained LaFleur's conclusive presumption analysis. The
Court found that classifications which are made in noncontractual social welfare settings, and
which are not arbitrary, are not invalid as long as they bear a rational relationship to the state's
goals. See id. at 770-72. The Court held that rational presumptions do not violate either the
due process clause or the equal protection clause. See id. at 772, 785. While not directly
overruling LaFleur, the Court distinguished it because it involved a contractually based claim.
Id. at 771-72. The Court found that where noncontractual claims are concerned there is "no
constitutionally protected status." Id. at 772. The Court expressed the concern that LaFleur
was being used as a "virtual engine of destruction" for rationally based legislative enactments.
Id.
330 Turner, 423 U.S. at 46. Once again, as in LaFleur, the Court ignored the question of
whether this pregnancy-based classification was a gender-based classification and whether this
classification was in turn a denial of equal protection. See note 327 supra. The per curiam
opinion in Turner was rather terse, with little discussion of the constitutional issues at stake.
The Court found merely that the statute's blanket disqualification of pregnant women was
"constitutionally invalid under the principles of the LaFleur case." 423 U.S. at 46; see note
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In the years following Turner, states began to reexamine their unem-
ployment compensation statutes in light of Turner and the addition of
section 3304(a)(12) to FUTA. 331 In Sylvara v. Industrial Commission,332
for example, the Colorado Supreme Court struck down a statute333 that
disqualified women who left work due to pregnancy from the receipt of
unemployment benefits until they had worked for thirteen weeks follow-
ing the termination of pregnancy. 334 Finding that the statute contained
"a conclusive presumption that any woman who has been pregnant is
unable to work until she has worked for thirteen weeks following the
termination of her pregnancy," the court held that the statute violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 335 The court cited
both LaFleur and Turner as dispositive in the case.336
In 1979, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit examined
whether an Indiana unemployment statute denied equal protection to
pregnant or formerly pregnant women. In International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers v. Indiana
Employment Security Board,337 the Seventh Circuit examined an Indiana
statute which provided that: (a) an individual whose unemployment was
due to pregnancy was deemed unavailable and therefore ineligible to re-
ceive unemployment benefits; and (b) a woman who left employment be-
cause of pregnancy was disqualified from receiving such benefits. 338
Ignoring the fact that the Supreme Court's Turner decision had dealt
only with a statute that involved a statutory period of ineligibility, the
Seventh Circuit held that the Indiana statute violated the fourteenth
amendment pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Turner.339 The
court stated that "[a] statute that denies unemployment benefits to all
women who are unemployed because of pregnancy without regard to
whether individual pregnant women have the physical capacity to con-
tinue work is invalid under [the holding in Turner].' '34°
327 supra.
331 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) (1982).
332 191 Colo. 92, 550 P.2d 868 (1976).
333 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-73-108(8)(d)(IV) (1973) (repealed 1984). The court had previously
upheld the statute in Miller v. Industrial Comm'n, 173 Colo. 476, 480 P.2d 565 (1971). See
text accompanying notes 304-06 supra.
334 Sylvara, 191 Colo. at 94-95, 550 P.2d at 869-70.
335 Id.
336 Id. at 94-95, 550 P.2d at 870.
337 600 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1979).
338 See Ind. Code Ann. § 22-4-14-3(d) (West 1981) (historical note indicating repeal of
former § 22-4-14-3(d) in 1975); Ind. Code Ann. § 22-4-15-1 (West 1981) (historical note indi-
cating repeal of former subsection (4) in 1977).
339 International Union, 600 F.2d at 120.
340 Id. In a somewhat different vein, the California Court of Appeal was asked to examine
the constitutionality of the state unemployment department's procedure for adjudging the ben-
efits due pregnant women. In Gunn v. California Employment Dev. Dep't, 94 Cal. App. 3d
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The first challenge to a neutral state unemployment statute under
FUTA section 3304(a)(12) was addressed by the Fourth Circuit in Brown
v. Porcher.341 At issue was a South Carolina statute that disqualified
from the receipt of unemployment benefits individuals who had left their
most recent work voluntarily, without good cause. 342 The court noted
that although the statute did not expressly mention pregnancy, it had
been construed to disqualify women who left work due to pregnancy. 343
The court struck down this application of the statute because it violated
FUTA section 3304(a)(12), stating that section 3304(a)(12) was remedial
in nature and that it should be broadly construed. 344 Answering the ar-
gument that section 3304(a)(12) was intended to be merely a codification
of the Turner decision, the court stated that if "Congress had intended
... only to codify the Turner decision and... [bar] discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy, it could easily have drafted a statute reflecting those
limited purposes. '3 45
As noted earlier, in order for a state's employers to qualify for the
federal unemployment tax credit, the state's unemployment law must be
certified by the United States Department of Labor as meeting a number
of standards, including that set out in FUTA section 3304(a)(12).3 46 Re-
sponding to the argument that South Carolina's law had been certified-
since it did not expressly mention pregnancy it was facially valid-the
Brown court noted that the certification "makes no reference to the inter-
pretation that the South Carolina Commission has placed on the state
law."'3 47 Furthermore, the court was not impressed with a letter from the
Department of Labor, solicited during the litigation, which stated that
FUTA section 3304(a)(12) has been interpreted to prohibit only discrimi-
nation against pregnancy. 348 The court gave this letter little weight, re-
658, 156 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1979), a claimant applied for benefits and was asked several questions
related to pregnancy after the department personnel had concluded that she was pregnant. Id.
at 661-62, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 586-87. Assuming that under California constitutional law inquir-
ies about pregnancy discriminate against women, the court found that the department's proce-
dure was an unjustified invasion of the claimant's right to privacy. Id. at 662-63, 156 Cal.
Rptr. at 587-89.
341 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983). An excellent discus-
sion of this case can be found in Note, Denial of Unemployment Benefits to Otherwise Eligible
Women on the Basis of Pregnancy: Section 3304(a)(12) of the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1925, 1927, 1932-35, 1941, 1954-57 (1984).
342 S.C. Code Ann. § 41-35-120(1) (Law. Co-op. 1986).
343 Brown, 660 F.2d at 1003. The court also noted that there was an exception to this
disqualification made for women who left on maternity leaves of absence or who had been
discharged because of pregnancy. Id. at 1003 n.2.
344 Id. at 1004.
345 Id.
346 See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
347 Brown, 660 F.2d at 1004.
348 Id.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 63:532
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
sponding that the administrator "accepts the premise that pregnancy
should be treated like any other illness without explaining how this
premise can be reconciled with the exceptional treatment of pregnancy
embodied in section 3304(a)(12)." 349 The court concluded that the prac-
tice of the state's unemployment commission contravened section
3304(a)(12), and affirmed the lower court's order of retroactive payments
to claimants who had been denied benefits under this practice.350 The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, 351 although three dissent-
ing justices would have granted certiorari because, in their opinion, the
conflict between the positions of the Department of Labor and the
Fourth Circuit would remain a source of substantial uncertainty for
pregnant women.3 52 The matter was not to be addressed again by the
Supreme Court until three years later, when certiorari was granted in
Wimberly v. Labor & Industrial Relations Commission.353
349 Id. at 1005.
350 Id. at 1005-06.
351 459 U.S. 1150 (1983).
352 Id. at 1151-53 (White, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). Justice White, joined by Jus-
tices Powell and Rehnquist, noted that the issue was one of concern to the states (citing South
Carolina's $1.5 million increase in benefits paid due to the result in the case), large numbers of
pregnant women, and the Department of Labor. Id. at 1152-53. He also stated that another
issue should be resolved on Supreme Court review: whether the court of appeals violated the
eleventh amendment's prohibition on federal courts entering judgments which would be satis-
fied out of a state's general revenues. Id. at 1153.
353 475 U.S. 1118 (1986). Before discussing Wimberly, it should be noted that, in addition
to the standards for eligibility and disqualification, one other area of state unemployment law
has been challenged by pregnant women. In Buchanan v. Director of the Division of Employ-
ment Sec., 393 Mass. 329, 471 N.E.2d 345 (1984), three public school teachers who were
terminated from their positions were denied unemployment benefits because they had not satis-
fied the "base period" requirements under Massachusetts law. Id. at 330, 471 N.E.2d at 346;
see text accompanying note 43 supra. The teachers had been on unpaid maternity leave and
had not earned the wages sufficient to entitle them to unemployment compensation. Id. at
331-32, 471 N.E.2d at 346. The teachers asserted that the statutory requirement on its face,
and in its application to these claimants, violated the Massachusetts Equal Rights Amend-
ment. Mass. Const. Amends. art. 106 (prohibiting a denial of "equality... because of sex").
The court found the statute to be facially constitutional, as it contained no explicit sex-based
distinction. Buchanan, 393 Mass. at 334, 471 N.E.2d at 348. The court also found no evi-
dence that application of the statute resulted in any disparate impact on women. Id. at 335,
471 N.E.2d at 349. The teachers then took the case to federal court, claiming that the statute
and its application violated FUTA section 3304(a)(12) and the due process and equal protec-
tion clauses of the United States Constitution. Buchanan v. Demong, 654 F. Supp. 139 (D.
Mass. 1987). As Wimberly had been decided by that time, the court found that the statute
clearly did not violate FUTA section 3304(a)(12). Id. at 142-43. Regarding the constitutional
challenges, the court stated that "the connection between plaintiffs' procreational and privacy
rights and the base earnings requirement is so attenuated that it cannot be reasonably said that
the base earnings requirement impinges on the exercise of those rights." Id. at 143.
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II
WIMBERLY V LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
COMMISSION
On January 21, 1987, the Supreme Court of the United States de-
cided the case of Wimberly v. Labor and Industrial Relations Commis-
sion.354 Justice O'Connor, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated
that certiorari had been granted because the decision of the Missouri
Supreme Court conflicted with that of the Fourth Circuit in Brown v.
Porcher355 on a question of "practical significance in the administration
of state unemployment compensation laws."'356
In 1980, Linda Wimberly, an employee of the J.C. Penney Com-
pany, requested a leave of absence from her job in order to give birth to
her baby.357 Her leave was granted, but without a guarantee of job rein-
statement when she recovered from the birth.358 Within a month after
the birth of her child, Ms. Wimberly notified her employer that she
wished to return to work.359 However, she was informed that there were
no positions available for her at that time. 36°
After Ms. Wimberly filed a claim for unemployment benefits with
the Missouri Division of Employment Security, the Division determined
that she had "quit because of pregnancy.1 361 The Missouri unemploy-
ment compensation statute disqualifies a claimant for unemployment
benefits if that individual "has left work voluntarily without good cause
attributable to his work or to his employer. ' 362 Since Ms. Wimberly's
354 479 U.S. 511 (1987).
355 660 F.2d 1001 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983).
356 479 U.S. at 512.
357 Id.
358 Id. at 513. Many employers offer "leaves of absence" which include no guarantee of job
reinstatement. As has been noted in one study on national parental leave policies, "[t]he exis-
tence of some type of job guarantee is critical to employees taking parental leaves. Without
promise of reinstatement, taking a leave is tantamount to quitting." Catalyst, Report on a
National Study of Parental Leaves 29 (1986). Surveys indicate that 75 to 88% of employers
who offer maternity leaves include some measure of job protection-reinstatement to the same
or a similar job-as a part of their leave policy. See M. Radford, Parental Leave-Judicial and
Legislative Trends: Current Practices in the Workplace 20 (Int'l Found. of Employee Benefits
Research Report No. 87-3, June, 1987).
359 Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 513.
360 Id.
361 Id.
362 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 288.050.1 (1986). The statute provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding the other provisions of this law, a claimant shall be disqualified for
waiting week credit or benefits until after he has earned wages for work insured under
the unemployment compensation laws of any state equal to ten times his weekly benefit
amount if the deputy finds:
(1) That he has left his work voluntarily without good cause attributable to his
work or to his employer ....
Id. As is evident from the statute, the disqualification of a claimant under these circumstances
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pregnancy was not considered good cause attributable to her work or her
employer, she was denied unemployment benefits.3 63 After pursuing the
appropriate administrative appeals, 364 Ms. Wimberly sought review in
the courts. The Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri concluded
that the application of the Missouri statute to Ms. Wimberly's situation
was inconsistent with FUTA section 3304(a)(12), as construed in Brown
v. Porcher.365 The circuit court stated that the FUTA amendment had
"banned the use of pregnancy or its termination as an excuse for denying
benefits to otherwise eligible women. '366 This decision was affirmed by
the Missouri Court of Appeals. 367 However, the court of appeals stated
that it had "reservations concerning the soundness of the ruling in
Brown ",368
The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Missouri
Court of Appeals, holding that it was not bound by the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Brown v. Porcher.3 69 Instead, the Missouri Supreme Court
relied on previous state appellate decisions interpreting the Missouri stat-
ute to disqualify any claimant who left work for a reason that was not
causally connected to the claimant's work or employer.370 The Missouri
continues until the claimant has earned an amount equal to ten times the amount she would
have received in unemployment compensation benefits. Id. The "weekly benefit amount"
under Missouri law is equal to 4.5% of the total wages paid to the claimant during that quarter
of the five quarters preceding the time unemployment benefits began in which the claimant
received the highest amount in wages. Id. § 288.038. The current limit on the "weekly benefit
amount" is $150. Id. § 288.038.6.
363 Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 513.
364 The Division's appeals tribunal held a full evidentiary hearing and affirmed the initial
decision. Id. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission denied review. Id.
365 Id. In Brown v. Porcher, 660 F.2d 1001, 1004 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1150 (1983), the Fourth Circuit held that a state could not disqualify a woman from unem-
ployment benefits solely because she left work on account of her pregnancy. See notes 341-52
and accompanying text supra.
366 Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 513.
367 Id.
368 Id.
369 Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 688 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. 1985) (en bane).
370 See Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 514 (construing Wimberly, 688 S.W.2d at 346). The Missouri
Supreme Court cited the following cases as support for its ruling: Fifer v. Missouri Div. of
Employment See., 665 S.W.2d 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (absent evidence that illness was caused
or contributed to in some manner by employment, it could not be said that claimant "left work
involuntarily with good cause attributable to her work"); Division of Employment See. v.
Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 617 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (employee taking
leave of absence, with a right to return contingent on availability of a job, had voluntarily left
her job without good cause attributable to employer); Duffy v. Labor & Indus. Relations
Comm'n, 556 S.W.2d 195 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977) (claimant who terminated employment due to
personal illness unrelated to employment did so voluntarily without good cause attributable to
her work); Neeley v. Industrial Comm'n, 379 S.W.2d 201 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (affirming
denial of benefits to claimant who was granted one year pregnancy leave, who sought, but was
for three weeks denied, permission to return to work after the birth, and who was then permit-
ted to return to work); LaPlante v. Industrial Comm'n, 367 S.W.2d 24 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963)
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Supreme Court concluded that section 3304(a)(12) did not mandate pref-
erential treatment for pregnancy; rather, the court found that this statute
only prohibited states from "singling out pregnancy for unfavorable
treatment."' 371 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the Missouri Supreme Court.372
The Court began its analysis with a succinct review of the history
and structure of FUTA. The Court noted that FUTA leaves the actual
administration of unemployment compensation programs to state discre-
tion.373 Although such programs vary, the Court observed that all states
require individuals applying for unemployment benefits to satisfy some
version of a three-part test.374 First, the number of hours a claimant
worked, or the amount of wages she earned, must meet a statutory mini-
mum. 375 Second, a claimant must be "eligible"-in other words, both
able to work and available for work.376 Third, a claimant must not be
"disqualified" from receiving benefits by any provisions of the various
state laws. 377 The Court observed that "most states" treat pregnancy as
voluntary termination for good cause. 378 The Court noted, however, that
Missouri is among the few states that define good cause narrowly, to
include only those terminations that occur for reasons directly attribut-
able to the work or the employer.379
According to the Court, Ms. Wimberly recognized that the Missouri
statute was neutral in that it treated pregnancy in the same manner as
any other type of temporary disability.38 0 The Court stated that Ms.
Wimberly's position was that section 3304(a)(12) is a federal requirement
that states allow women who have left work because of pregnancy to
(affirming denial of benefits to slaughterhouse laborer who claimed, unsuccessfully, that his job
was injurious to his back and holding that he left voluntarily without good cause attributable
to work); Bussmann Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 335 S.W.2d 456 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960)
(reversing grant of benefits to claimant who left work because of pregnancy but was refused
leave of absence as well as opportunity to return to work after birth); Bussmann Mfg. Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 327 S.W.2d 487 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959) (affirming grant of benefits to em-
ployee who, upon returning to work after a leave of absence, was offered work only on machine
her doctor had advised would cause her ill effects).
371 Wimberly, 688 S.W.2d at 349.
372 479 U.S. at 514.




377 Id.; see also text accompanying notes 42-59 supra (discussing three requirements).
378 Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 515. The Court divided the states that employ this type of treat-
ment into those which specifically enumerate pregnancy as "good cause" in the statute-such
as Arkansas, South Dakota and Tennessee-and those states that have reached the same result
by way of administrative determination--such as California. Id. at 515 & n.1.
379 Id. at 515-16. But see Rosettenstein, supra note 50, at 396 (discussing contrary findings
of recent survey).
380 Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 516.
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receive unemployment benefits when they become available and able to
work, "regardless of the State's treatment of other similarly situated
claimants." 381
The Court, however, concluded that section 3304(a)(12) of FUTA
merely prohibited states from singling out pregnancy for unfavorable
treatment. 382 The Court first noted that the focus of the statutory lan-
guage of section 3304(a)(12) was the state's basis for its decision, not the
claimant's reason for leaving a job.38 3 The state of Missouri adopted a
neutral rule that had the effect of "incidentally" disqualifying pregnant
claimants "as part of a larger group. '384 The Court stated that, to apply
Missouri law, "it is not necessary to know that petitioner left because of
pregnancy: all that is relevant is that she stopped work for a reason bear-
ing no causal connection to her work or her employer. ' 38 5 For this rea-
son the Court found that pregnancy could not possibly have been the sole
basis for the decision to deny benefits. 386
The Court relied on three other arguments to support its conclusion.
First, according to the Court, its construction of FUTA section
3304(a)(12) was consistent with the Court's prior construction of simi-
larly worded statutes.387 Second, the Court concluded that the legislative
history of FUTA section 3304(a)(12) indicates no intent on the part of
Congress to enact a law requiring preferential treatment. 388 Finally, the
Court emphasized that the Department of Labor has interpreted section
3304(a)(12) as an antidiscrimination statute.389
In connection with the first argument, the Court noted its interpre-
tation of other similarly worded statutes designed to protect certain
groups. In Monroe v. Standard Oil Co.,390 it had concluded that a provi-
sion of the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of
1974391 guaranteed members of the nation's reserve forces "the same
treatment afforded their co-workers without military obligations," but
did not require an employer to make special arrangements to accomodate




384 Id. at 517.
385 Id.
386 Id.
387 Id. at 517-18.
388 Id. at 581-21.
389 Id. at 521-22.
390 452 U.S. 549 (1981).
391 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3) (1982).
392 See Monroe, 452 U.S. at 560-62. The statute interpreted in Monroe provided that a
person "shall not be denied retention in employment or any promotion or other incident or
advantage of employment because of any obligation as a member of a Reserve component of
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cision in Monroe as an occasion where it had construed a statute as
"prohibiting disadvantageous treatment rather than as mandating prefer-
ential treatment. '393
The Wimberly Court also compared its construction of FUTA sec-
tion 3304(a)(12) with its interpretation of section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973394 in Southeastern Community College v. Davis.395 The
Court, in holding that section 504 required only "evenhanded treat-
ment," pointed out that another section of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
indicated that Congress recognized the difference between even-handed
treatment and "affirmative efforts to overcome the disabilities caused by
handicaps. ' 396 The Court noted further that section 504 of the Act did
not specifically refer to affirmative action. 397 The Davis Court concluded
that section 504 did not require an educational institution to lower or
modify its standards to accommodate handicapped persons. 398 Quoting
the Armed Forces." 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3) (1982). The petitioner in Monroe was a full-time
employee in an Ohio refinery. Monroe, 452 U.S. at 551. Because the refinery was always open,
employees were scheduled to work five eight-hour days in a row each week, but in a different
five-day sequence each week. Id. The petitioner, a reservist, had to attend reserve training
sessions one weekend a month and for two weeks each summer. Id. at 551-52. This had
caused the petitioner to reschedule a number of his shifts in order to be available for reserve
duty on the required weekends. Id. at 552. On some occasions, however, the petitioner was
unable to arrange a switch with another employee. Id. At other times, the employer had used
substitute employees to replace petitioner, often paying these substitutes overtime wages. Id.
at 552. The petitioner argued that the company was obligated under 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3) to
make special efforts to schedule his hours so that he could avoid any lost income by reason of
his reserve obligations. Id. at 560. The Supreme Court characterized the petitioner's request
as requiring work assignments unavailable to non-reservist employees at the respondent's refin-
ery. Id. at 561. After examining the legislative history of the statute, the Supreme Court
concluded that the congressional purpose was "to protect employee reservists from discharge,
denial of promotional opportunities, or other corporate adverse treatment solely by reason of
the military obligations; there was never any suggestion of employer responsibility to provide
preferential treatment." Id. at 562.
393 Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 517.
394 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that "[n]o other-
wise qualified handicapped individual ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.. .." Id.
395 442 U.S. 397 (1979). In Davis, a student seeking training as a registered nurse was
denied admission to a state program because it was believed that her hearing disability made it
impossible for her to participate in the program and to operate safely as a registered nurse. Id.
at 401. The student contended that the Rehabilitation Act compelled the state institution to
"undertake affirmative action that would dispense with the need for effective oral communica-
tion" in the nursing program. Id. at 407. The student suggested, for example, that she be
given individual supervision by faculty members when she was attending patients and that
certain of her required courses be dispensed with altogether. Id.
396 Id. at 410. Section 501(b) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (1982),
requires an affirmative action plan for the hiring of handicapped persons by the federal
government.
397 Davis, 442 U.S. at 411.
398 Id. at 413.
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from its earlier Davis opinion, the Wimberly Court noted that that
construction of the statutory language was "intended to eliminate dis-
crimination against otherwise qualified individuals," and was thus com-
parable to its current interpretation of section 3304(a)(12) of FUTA.399
The second portion of the Supreme Court's analysis in Wimberly
primarily responds to Ms. Wimberly's reliance upon the legislative his-
tory of FUTA section 3304(a)(12). 4 Ms. Wimberly argued that the lan-
guage of section 3304(a)(12) manifested a clear intent on the part of
Congress to prohibit any denial of unemployment benefits based solely on
a claimant's pregnancy. 40 1 She pointed out that Congress typically used
the word "discrimination" in statutes which were intended merely to
prohibit discrimination, 40 2 citing as an example Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.403 Ms. Wimberly noted further that the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978, which expands the meaning of sex discrimi-
nation in Title VII to include discrimination on the basis of pregnancy,
provides that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth or related medi-
cal conditions shall be treated the same... as other persons not so af-
fected but similar in their ability or inability to work ...."404 Ms.
Wimberly compared this language to that of the original draft of section
3304(a)(12), which provided as follows:
No person shall be denied compensation under such State law
solely on the basis of pregnancy and determinations under any provi-
sion of such State law relating to voluntary termination of employment,
availability for work, active search for work, or refusal to accept work
shall not be made in a manner which discriminates on the basis of
pregnancy.40 5
Ms. Wimberly argued that this change, reflecting a deletion of the an-
tidiscrimination language, demonstrated "legislative intent to enact
broad remedial legislation more comprehensive than the anti-discrimina-
tion provision which appeared in the initial bill."'40 6 The Supreme Court
disagreed with her conclusion, stating that it found it difficult to believe
that the deletion of language could expand the scope of a statute.40 7 The
Supreme Court suggested that "Congress intended simply to eliminate a
399 Wimberly, 479 at 517-18 (quoting Davis, 442 U.S. at 410).
400 Id. at 418-21.
401 Brief for Petitioner at 18, Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511
(1987) (No. 85-129) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].
402 See id. at 15-16.
403 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
404 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
405 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 401, at 19 (citing H.R. 8366, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a)
(1975); S. 2079, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a) (1975)) (emphasis in brief).
406 Id. at 20.
407 Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 519.
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lengthy and redundant phrase, without intending to change the meaning
of the provision." 408
The Court went on to examine Ms. Wimberly's reliance on other
portions of the legislative history of section 3304(a)(12). Ms. Wimberly
argued that section 3304(a)(12) applied to more than just the nineteen
states listed in the House Report as having" 'special disqualification pro-
visions pertaining to pregnancy.' "409 Missouri was not one of these
states, but Ms, Wimberly argued that Missouri was not included because
its policy was not apparent from its statute. 410 The Supreme Court re-
sponded by asserting that "Missouri does not have a 'policy' specifically
relating to pregnancy; it neutrally disqualifies workers who leave their
jobs for reasons unrelated to their employment. 411 The Court also
noted that the Senate Report412 focused almost exclusively on its intent
to prohibit the type of statute struck down in Turner v. Department of
Employment Security41 3 as unconstitutional.41 4 The Court concluded
that
petitioner can point to nothing in the Committee Reports, or elsewhere
in the statute's legislative history, that evidences congressional intent
to mandate preferential treatment for women on account of preg-
nancy.... Indeed, the legislative history shows that Congress was
focused only on the issue addressed by the plain language of §
3304(a)(12): prohibiting rules that single out pregnant women or for-
408 Id.
409 Id. (quoting H. Rep. No. 755, supra note 69, at 7). For a discussion of the House Report
and UIPL No. 33-75, see notes 71-73 and accompanying text supra. The Court divided the
listed state statutes into three categories: (a) those which disqualified pregnant women from
receiving unemployment compensation for a specified period surrounding the date of child-
birth; (b) those which specifically disqualified women who terminated work because of preg-
nancy; and (c) those which had "miscellaneous provisions" singling out pregnancy for
discriminatory treatment. Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 520.
410 Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 520.
411 Id.
412 S. Rep. No. 1265, supra note 69.
413 423 U.S. 44, 46 (1975).
414 Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 520-21; see text accompanying notes 323-30 supra (discussing
Turner). The Court did not seem concerned by the fact emphasized in Ms. Wimberly's brief
that the Turner decision was not handed down until a month after the introduction of the bills
which included the initial versions of section 3304(a)(12). Brief for Petitioner, supra note 401,
at 20. Perhaps the Court was swayed by the argument made in both the Respondent's brief
and the brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, National Women's Political Caucus, and
Coal Employment Project as Amicus Curiae, that, regardless of the original impetus for the
bill, after Turner it was consistently stated in the legislative history that section 3304(a)(12)
was intended as a codification of that decision. Brief for Respondent at 33, Wimberly v. Labor
& Indus. Relations Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511 (1987) (No. 85-129); Brief for ACLU, National
Women's Political Caucus and Coal Employment Project as Amicus Curiae at 10-11, Wim-
berly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511 (1987) (No. 85-129) [hereinafter
Brief for ACLU].
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merly pregnant women for disadvantageous treatment.4 15
The final portion of the Supreme Court's analysis relied on the De-
partment of Labor's interpretation of section 3304(a)(12). The Depart-
ment of Labor had informed the states that it interpreted section
3304(a)(12) as requiring only that a pregnant individual not be treated
differently from other unemployed individuals, and that benefits be based
only on whether the individual met the state's conditions for receipt of
such benefits.4 16
In summary, the Supreme Court of the United States based its deci-
sion that section 3304(a)(12) did not require preferential treatment for
pregnant or formerly pregnant women on three basic premises. First, the
Court looked to its interpretation of similar statutes and asserted that
section 3304(a)(12) should be interpreted to mandate only nondiscrimi-
natory treatment, as had the other statutes. Second, the legislative his-
tory of section 3304(a)(12) indicated no intention on the part of Congress
to strike down facially neutral state laws. Finally, according to the
Court, great deference should be given to the continuing interpretation of
the Department of Labor, the agency designated to enforce the statute.
The clear and concise nature of Justice O'Connor's opinion, com-
bined with the fact that she was joined in that opinion by all of the partic-
ipating Justices,41 7 would seem to indicate that the Court's analysis is
unassailable. The Court's conclusion was simple: the Missouri statute is
a neutral rule that incidentally disqualifies pregnant claimants, but treats
these claimants no differently than others similarly situated.4 1 8 To apply
the Missouri rule, it is not even necessary to know that pregnancy was
the cause of the unemployment.4 19 Therefore, the neutral application of
such a rule cannot be characterized as a decision made solely on the basis
of pregnancy.4 20 A reader of the Court's decision is left either with a
secure feeling that equal treatment has once again been upheld and, to
some degree, applauded by the Supreme Court or conversely, that
through some semantic sleight-of-hand, the interpretation of a "neutral"
rule and the term "solely on the basis of pregnancy" have hampered the
emerging participation and economic force of women in the workplace.
A closer examination of the Wimberly opinion indicates that the
415 Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 521.
416 Id. at 521-22. After the Wimberly decision, the Department of Labor issued another
Program Letter informing the states that the case had implicitly overruled Brown v. Porcher,
660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983), and thus that section
3304(a)(12) "may no longer be said to require preferential treatment." Unemployment Insur-
ance Program Letter No. 14-37, 1B Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 21,856-57 (Apr. 21, 1987).
417 Justice Blackmun took no part in the decision. Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 522.
418 Id. at 516-17.
419 Id. at 517.
420 Id.
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Supreme Court's reasoning is not as solidly based as the unanimous vote
of the Justices might make it appear. For example, the Court compares
its interpretation of section 3304(a)(12) of FUTA with its interpretation
of similarly worded statutes concerning reservists42' and handicapped
persons.422 However, this comparison is not apt. In both Monroe and
Davis, the Supreme Court addressed situations in which an employer or
institution was asked to make accommodations that were both inconve-
nient and costly. In Monroe, the employer was asked to juggle shifts and
pay overtime to other employees in order to guarantee a forty hour week
for the reservist.423 In Davis, the educational institution essentially was
asked to hire interpreters, provide special faculty assistance, and make
exceptions to its normal schedule in order to put the handicapped stu-
dent in the same position she would have been in had she not been hear-
ing-impaired.424 In both of these cases, the members of the protected
groups were requesting a form of "affirmative action" to secure for them-
selves results equal to those that accrued to individuals who did not pos-
sess their special characteristics. Both of these cases involved more than
a demand that the group not be denied certain privileges merely because
of their differentiating characteristics.
It is arguable that in Wimberly, the petitioner was not asking for an
additional benefit to put her in the same position as those not exhibiting
her differentiating characteristic: pregnancy. Ms. Wimberly was not
asking that she be paid unemployment benefits during the time in which
she was in fact unable to and unavailable for work.42 5 Rather, she was
requesting simply that she not be refused unemployment benefits at that
point in time when, being both available and able to work, she was un-
able to find employment. 426
421 Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549 (1981).
422 Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 379 (1979); see text accompanying
notes 394-99 supra.
423 Monroe, 452 U.S. at 560.
424 Davis, 442 U.S. at 407-08.
425 See Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 513.
426 Id. This distinction bears a certain resemblance to the benefit/burden analysis used by
the United States Supreme Court in examining whether certain employee policies related to
pregnancy violated the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex contained in Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982). In General Electric Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), the Court examined the employee benefits package of a private
employer that did not include pregnancy among the disabilities covered by its nonoccupational
sickness and accident plan. Id. at 127. The Court noted that discrimination in Title VII cases
"can be established in some circumstances upon proof that the effect of an otherwise facially
neutral plan or classification is to discriminate against members of one class or another." Id.
at 137. The Court held, however, that the disability plan did not have a discriminatory effect
on women and that the insurance package was not shown to be worth more to men than it was
to women simply because it did not insure against all risks. Id. at 138-39.
The Court based its opinion in Gilbert on its earlier decision in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
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The question of whether an employer must provide additional ac-
commodation has frequently been examined in cases arising under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act.427 Title VII prohibits employment discrimi-
nation against individuals on the basis of their race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.428 In 1972, Title VII was amended to require an em-
ployer to make "reasonable accommodations" for an employee's reli-
gious beliefs if such accommodation would not create "undue hardship"
for the employer.429 In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,430 how-
ever, under facts somewhat resembling those of the Monroe case, the
United States Supreme Court apparently limited the application of the
reasonable accommodation requirement. The employee in Hardison was
discharged from a job requiring a seven day work week because he would
not work on Saturday due to his religious beliefs.431 The Supreme Court
found that the reasonable accommodation provision of Title VII did not
require an employer to violate a collective bargaining agreement by com-
pelling an employee to change shifts with the religious employee, to pay
U.S. 484 (1974). In Geduldig, the Court found that the exclusion of pregnancy from the dis-
abilities which were covered by a state disability insurance program did not violate the equal
protection clause. Id. at 492-97. In fact, the Court concluded that, under the system, "[t]here
is no risk from which men are protected and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from
which women are protected and men are not." Id. at 496-97.
The Gilbert decision was soon followed by Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136
(1977). In that case, the employer's leave policy required pregnant employees to take a formal
leave of absence. Id. at 137. The employees did not receive sick pay while on such leave. Id.
Additionally, the employees lost all accrued job seniority, so that as a result they were not
guaranteed a permanent position upon their return. Id. The Court distinguished the forfeiture
of accrued seniority from the denial of sick pay because the denial of sick pay was merely a
refusal to extend a benefit to pregnant employees, while the forfeiture of seniority "imposed on
women a substantial burden that men need not suffer." Id. at 142. The Court refused to
interpret Title VII in a manner which would allow an employer to "burden female employees
in such a way as to deprive them of employment opportunities because of their different role."
Id.
The state statute examined in Wimberly could arguably be said to impose a burden on
pregnant or formerly pregnant women, rather than merely deny them a benefit. However, it is
important to note that Wimberly differs from Geduldig, Gilbert, and Satty in that the unem-
ployment statute applies to all individuals who leave their jobs, not just pregnant individuals.
427 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
428 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
429 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(7), 86 Stat. 103,
103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1982)). This amendment adopted the language of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines originally promulgated in 1967. See
29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(b) (1987).
430 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
431 See id. at 67-79. Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, the Saturday shift was
assigned to employees based on their accrued seniority. Id. at 67. Lacking the requisite senior-
ity, Hardison was assigned a Saturday shift and was unable to trade shifts with another em-
ployee. Id. at 68. TWA refused to let him work only four days due to the resulting
impairment of its business operations and the high cost of filling the shift with another em-
ployee. Id. at 68-69.
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extra wages to a voluntary substitute, or to run the shift with less than a
full contingent of employees. 432 Thus, even when interpreting a statute
expressly requiring additional accommodation, the Court seemed to af-
firm the premise of Monroe and Davis that anti-discrimination statutes do
not mandate preferential treatment.
However, the Wimberly Court failed to mention that the Court had
addressed the accommodation issue in two earlier decisions involving the
interaction between an employee's religious beliefs and the application of
state unemployment laws.4 33 It should be noted that these two cases
were decided under the first amendment rather than Title VII, as they
were not cases relating to discrimination in employment.434 However,
given the fact that these cases, like Wimberly, concerned a denial of un-
employment benefits, the Court's analysis is useful in understanding the
deficiencies in Wimberly. These two cases point to a possible distinction
between decisions construing anti-discrimination statutes such as Title
VII, and those addressing the treatment of individuals under state unem-
432 Id. at 76-81. The Court seemed particularly concerned with the fact that TWA was
bound by the seniority system set up in its collective bargaining agreement, which hampered it
from working out a job switch for Hardison. The Court noted that seniority systems are "af-
forded special treatment" under section 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982),
which exempts from the definition of "unlawful employment practice" those practices carried
out pursuant to a "bona fide seniority or merit system." 432 U.S. at 81-82. In a strong dissent,
Justice Marshall pointed out that "if an accommodation can be rejected simply because it
involves preferential treatment, then the regulation and statute [requiring reasonable accom-
modations], while brimming with 'sound and fury,' ultimately 'signifly] nothing."' Id. at 87.
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
In a more recent case, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that an employer
had violated Title VII by failing to accommodate an employee who had religious convictions
against working on Sundays. Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir. 1987). In
Smith, the employer allowed employees to trade shifts. Id. at 1083. However, the employee in
question stopped asking other employees to work on Sundays since he did not wish to ask
others to do what was, in his mind, a sin. Id. at 1084. The employee was fired after his third
unexcused Sunday absence. Id. The Court found that soliciting replacements would not have
been an undue hardship for the employer, and thus that the employer had not fulfilled its
obligation of reasonable accommodation. Id. at 1089. On the other hand, in EEOC v. Ithaca
Indus., Inc., 829 F.2d 519 (4th Cir. 1987), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found
that an employee who refused categorically to work on Sundays precluded the employer from
making reasonable accommodations for his religious beliefs. Id. at 521-22. The employer se-
lected employees for the Sunday shift on the basis of the number of hours each employee
worked during the preceding week and whether the employee had worked on previous Sun-
days. Id. at 521. The Court found that the religious employee's absolutist position forced the
employer either to discharge him or to discriminate against other employees. See id. at 521-22.
433 See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
434 See generally Ratter, The Rise and Fall of Title VII's Requirement of Reasonable Ac-
commodation for Religious Employees, 11 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 63, 66-74 (1979) (dis-
cussing congressional intent to have Title VII require more of employers than is
constitutionally required of the government).




Both of these first amendment cases involved facially neutral provi-
sions in state unemployment statutes. In Sherbert v. Verner,436 an em-
ployee who was discharged because she refused on religious grounds to
work on Saturday was unable to obtain other employment due to this
religious belief.437 The state of South Carolina found her ineligible for
unemployment benefits because she failed to accept suitable work and
thus did not meet the requirement that she be "able to work .. and
available for work. ' 438 The United States Supreme Court reversed the
denial of benefits, finding that it clearly imposed an unconstitutional bur-
den on the free exercise of the claimant's religion.439
In Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Divi-
sion,44° an employee quit his job when he was transferred to a division
engaged in the manufacture of components for military tanks; he claimed
that working on weapons would violate the principles of his religion.441
The state of Indiana denied his claim for benefits because his termination
was not based upon good cause attributable to his employer.442 The state
argued that its law contained "neutral objective standards" for awarding
435 In embarking upon this analysis, the author remains fully aware of the Supreme Court's
doctrine "that we ought not to pass upon questions of constitutionality... unless such adjudi-
cation is unavoidable." Spector Motor Serv. Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944).
The Wimberly decision rested on a finding that the Missouri law did not violate FUTA section
3304(a)(12) and did not address whether the law denied pregnant and formerly pregnant
women rights guaranteed them under the due process and equal protection clauses. However,
the scant legislative history of FUTA section 3304(a)(12), see notes 69-75 and accompanying
text supra, combined with the contention that the statute was meant to be a codification of
Turner, see note 69 supra, a case decided on constitutional grounds, mandates that this Article
explore the relevant issues from a constitutional perspective.
436 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
437 Id. at 399.
438 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 68-113, 68-114(3) (Law. Co-op. 1986); see Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 400-
01.
439 374 U.S. 403-06. The Court then considered whether the state had advanced a compel-
ling interest that would justify this burden on the claimant's religious rights. The only interest
suggested by the state was the protection against "the filing of fraudulent claims by unscrupu-
lous claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work .... " Id. at 407. The Court
found no evidence to support this interest and, in any event, if evidence were produced, the
Court did not think the interest would be of such magnitude to justify the infringement on first
amendment rights. See id. at 407-09. The Court also discussed whether its holding fostered
the "establishment" of the claimant's religion in violation of the establishment clause of the
first amendment. Id. at 409-10. The Court found that "the extension of unemployment bene-
fits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshippers reflects nothing more than the gov-
ernmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences ...." Id. at 409.
440 450 U.S. 707 (1981); see Note, Unemployment Benefits and the Religion Clauses: A
Recurring Conflict, 36 U. Miami L. Rev. 585 (1982) (discussing Thomas).
441 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 709-11. The claimant discovered upon investigation that all other
in-plant job openings were also weapons-related, so he asked to be laid off. Id. at 710. When
that request was denied, he resigned. Id.
442 Id. at 712.
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unemployment benefits. 443 The Court concluded, as it did in Sherbert,
that the application of the statute in this case imposed an undue burden
upon the free exercise of the claimant's religion. 444
The analysis used in both of these cases is also applicable to the
circumstances of Wimberly. The Court in Sherbert stated that the denial
of benefits "forces [Sherbert] to choose between following the precepts of
her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one
of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other
hand." 445 The Court in Thomas found that conditioning the receipt of
benefits "upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith... [puts] substan-
tial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his
beliefs .... -446 Similarly, one could argue that disallowing unemploy-
ment benefits for terminations due to pregnancy forces a working woman
to choose between having children, thereby forfeiting unemployment in-
come, or remaining childless. The Supreme Court has made it clear that
"'freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is
one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause'." 447 Thus, the
Missouri statute arguably constituted an unacceptable infringement on
this liberty, making the statute constitutionally invalid, as well as in vio-
lation of FUTA.448
443 Id. at 717 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 271 Ind. 223,
237, 391 N.E.2d 1127, 1130 (1979)).
444 Id. at 718. The Court noted that the lower court, in affirming the denial of benefits, put
undue reliance on the fact that the claimant seemed uncertain about his beliefs and that an-
other follower of the claimant's religion had stated that he would find such work religiously
acceptable. Id. at 715. The Supreme Court opined that "[c]ourts are not arbiters of spiritual
interpretation" and that "courts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs because the
.. beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and precision that a more sophisticated person
might employ." Id. at 715-16. The Court rejected the state's argument that it had an interest
in protecting its unemployment fund by noting that there was no evidence that the number of
people who left their jobs for religious reasons would have any substantial effect on the fund.
Id. at 718-19. The Court also found no evidence to support the state's argument that the law
avoided detailed probing by employers into job applicants' religious beliefs. Id. Finally, the
Court held that its Sherbert reasoning was determinative with regard to the argument that
granting the benefits "established" the claimant's religion in Indiana. Id. at 719-20.
445 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
446 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18.
447 Turner v. Department of Employment See., 423 U.S. 44, 46 (1975) (quoting Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974)).
448 The freedom of personal choice in family matters has been recognized in a variety of
other cases examined by the United States Supreme Court, including Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraception); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (family
relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (child-rearing and education of children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (same).
Dicta in two cases interpreting Roe v. Wade might be used in an attempt to refute the
theory that Missouri's disqualification of pregnant women from receving unemployment bene-
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Moreover, Sherbert uses language which is quite relevant when ap-
plied to the Wimberly facts. The Sherbert Court found it "apparent that
appellant's declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the prac-
tice of her religion .... "449 It is exceedingly difficult to reconcile this
statement with the statement of the Wimberly Court that the "neutral
application" of the Missouri unemployment statute-an application
which resulted in the disqualification of women who left work to give
birth-"cannot be readily characterized as a decision made solely on the
basis of pregnancy.' '450
One of the essential elements upon which Ms. Wimberly and the
Supreme Court disagreed was the group of similarly situated claimants to
whom Ms. Wimberly should be compared in order to determine if the
statute was applied neutrally. The Supreme Court indicated that Ms.
Wimberly was treated in the same manner as any other claimant who left
her job voluntarily without good cause that was directly attributable to
her work or to the employer.4 1 In other words, the Supreme Court in-
eluded Ms. Wimberly in the category of persons who leave work due to
another type of physical disability, a death in the family, or the transfer
of the other spouse. Ms. Wimberly, on the other hand, would have pre-
ferred to have been compared to other sexually active employees who
had not been forced to forfeit unemployment benefits as a result of this
fits directly impinges on protected freedoms relating to marriage and family life. See Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977). For example, in
Maher, the Court stated that a state's choice not to fund abortions "places no obstacles-
absolute or otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion." Maher, 432 U.S. at
474. In Harris, the Court noted:
[R]egardless of whether the freedom of a woman to choose to terminate her pregnancy
for health reasons lies at the core or the periphery of the due process liberty recognized
in Wade, it simply does not follow that a woman's freedom of choice carries with it a
constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of
protected choices.... [A]Ithough government may not place obstacles in the path of a
woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own
creation.
Harris, 448 U.S. at 316. Adherents of this line of reasoning would argue that the denial of
unemployment benefits does not directly hinder a woman's choice to have a child, and thus is
not a direct infringement on her due process liberty. Such a conclusion, however, would not
only be contrary to the implicit conclusion in Sherbert, Turner, and Thomas-that a denial of
benefits is a direct infringement-but it would also be an attenuation of the language of Maher
and Harris beyond the precepts upon which these cases were based. It is difficult to imagine
the Court upholding a state or federal decision limiting the extent to which pregnancy and
childbirth expenses are covered by Medicaid as severely as the coverage for abortion expenses
has been limited.
449 374 U.S. at 404 (emphasis added). In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist characterized the
Thomas Court's holding as requiring a state "to provide financial assistance to a person solely
on the basis of his religious beliefs." Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450
U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
450 479 U.S. at 517 (emphasis added).
451 Id. at 516.
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activity.452 Ms. Wimberly argued that "[p]regnancy is not an illness. It
is a normal condition experienced by millions of healthy women. '453
While it may have been preferable for Congress to have also prohibited
disqualifications based on all illness-related separations from employ-
ment, she noted that section 3304(a)(12) specifically addressed preg-
nancy, thus distinguishing that physical condition from other medical
conditions.4 54 Placing pregnancy in the category of voluntary termina-
tions without good cause attributable to the employer denies benefits
solely on the basis of pregnancy, just as placing religious-based termina-
tions in this category denies benefits solely on the basis of religious be-
liefs. 455 In other words, had Ms. Wimberly not been pregnant she would
452 As Amici Curiae, the Equal Rights Advocates, California Women Lawyers, San Fran-
cisco Women Lawyers Alliance, and Tracy Goudy argued that pregnant women should be
compared for discrimination purposes to men who have also taken part in "procreative activi-
ties." They argued that
[t]he appropriate comparison to make in cases involving pregnancy-related discrimina-
tion is between women who have engaged in reproductive conduct and men who have
engaged in reproductive conduct. These groups are similarly situated because both par-
ticipate in the procreative process. Only these groups can exercise personal choice in
matters of reproduction. Pregnant women and all other disabled claimants do not share
any such similarities.
Brief for Equal Rights Advocates, California Women Lawyers, San Francisco Women Law-
yers Alliance, and Tracy Goudy as Amici Curiae at 8, Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations
Comm'n, 479 U.S. 511 (1987) (No. 85-129) [hereinafter Brief for Equal Rights Advocates].
The amici argued that, in order to ensure the equality of men and women in the workplace, the
procreative role of women must be accommodated. Id. at 7.
This same approach is taken by Professor Herma Hill Kay in her "episodic analysis"
approach to the treatment of pregnancy. See Kay, supra note 327, at 21-37. She argues that
male and female workers should always be treated equally except during those times when a
woman is pregnant. See id. at 26-27. At that point, Professor Kay argues, the workplace
should accommodate the woman's needs to ensure that she will experience no employment
disadvantage, compared to her male counterparts, as a result of her pregnancy. See id. at 27.
453 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 401, at 26.
454 Id. As will be discussed in Part III of this Article, the approach advocated by Ms.
Wimberly could be characterized as a "special treatment" approach in that she asked the
Court to view pregnancy as a unique condition, sui generis, which should be accommodated in
the workplace, rather than as a disability that should be treated like all other disabilities. See
text accompanying notes 533-36 infra.
455 An approach to pregnancy based upon the Sherbert and Thomas rationale would be
more akin to the due process approach employed by the Court in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (singling out reproductive function as fundamental liberty) than
the equal protection approach used by the Wimberly Court (comparing pregnant women with
other workers suffering from disabling conditions). See Williams, supra note 167, at 341. In
this context, one argument which could have been presented by Ms. Wimberly concerns the
timing of the enactment of FUTA section 3304(a)(12). As mentioned above, see note 69 supra,
this amendment had already been introduced in Congress at the time the Supreme Court
handed down the decision in Turner v. Department of Employment Sec., 423 U.S. 44 (1975).
The holding in Turner was based upon the LaFleur reasoning. In LaFleur, pregnancy was
treated as part and parcel of a constitutionally protected right-the right of reproductive
choice-and not as a condition to be compared with other disabilities. See LaFleur, 414 U.S.
at 639-40. If, in fact, section 3304(a)(12) was meant only to codify Turner, see text accompa-
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not have terminated her employment and been forced to seek unemploy-
ment benefits. When she sought benefits, she was able and available for
work. She had applied to her employer for reinstatement. The only rea-
son she was denied benefits was because she had left her previous em-
ployment to have a child. Thus, upon a close analysis of Wimberly, there
appears a double-edged sword. On the one hand, Missouri offers no pro-
tection against termination for a woman who must take time off to de-
liver her baby-mandated job reinstatement 456-while on the other
hand, when she is denied reinstatement, the state does not deem her qual-
ified for unemployment benefits. Many women in Missouri, therefore,
must choose between having a family and being treated as active, "at-
tached" members of the workforce.
Another weakness in the Supreme Court's analysis in Wimberly is
its reliance upon the Department of Labor's interpretation of FUTA sec-
tion 3304(a)(12), and the letter listing the nineteen states which, prior to
Turner, had laws that discriminated "solely on the basis of preg-
nancy. ' 457 Included among the statutes listed in the letter is Oregon's,
which the letter described as follows: "Pregnancy - Presumed unable to
work if unemployed because of a disability, including pregnancy, until
administrator determines she is able to work. '458 Although the Wim-
berly Court stated that neither Missouri "nor any state with a rule like
Missouri's" is included in the list of the nineteen states, 459 it is difficult to
differentiate the Oregon statute from the Missouri statute. The only real
difference between the two statutes is that, while the Missouri statute
treats pregnancy as it treats other disabilities, it does not specifically
mention the word pregnancy. On the other hand, the Oregon statute,
which is included on the Department of Labor's list and thus considered
discriminatory, specifically states that pregnancy is treated as any other
disability.460 Evidently, the word pregnancy in the Oregon statute was a
fatal flaw, for without this unfortunate choice of words, the Oregon stat-
nying notes 412-15 supra, then the codification arguably was of a rule mandating special rather
than equal treatment.
456 Some state statutes require employers to grant unpaid maternity leaves with a guarantee
of job reinstatement for periods ranging from six weeks to four months. See, e.g., Cal. Gov't
Code § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980); Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-311 (1987). The California statute
was recently upheld by the United States Supreme Court in California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987), against a challenge that its mandate of special treatment for
pregnant women was preempted by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See text accom-
panying note 110 supra (discussing mandated maternity leaves). See generally M. Radford,
supra note 358, at 2-14 (describing state and federal statutes concerning parental leave, as well
as relevant court decisions).
457 See Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 520; text accompanying note 79 supra.
458 UIPL No. 33-75, supra note 75; see Or. Rev. Stat. § 657.155(2) (1976).
459 Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 520.
460 See Or. Rev. Stat. § 657.155(2) (1976).
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ute too would have been deemed a "neutral" rule.461
A connected matter, which is discussed superficially in Wimberly, is
the weight that the interpretation of a statute by the governmental
agency assigned to enforce it will be given by the Court. The Wimberly
Court noted that the Department of Labor's interpretation of section
3304(a)(12) confirmed its view of the statute.462 However, in a case cited
by the Wimberly Court for other purposes, Southeastern Community
College v. Davis,463 the Court refused to defer to the interpretation of a
federal statute by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) which took the form of regulations promulgated under the stat-
ute. Citing Teamsters v. Daniel,464 the Davis Court noted that the defer-
ence given to an agency interpretation is limited by the obligation "to
honor the clear meaning of a statute, as revealed by its language, pur-
pose, and history. ' 465 The Court in Wimberly explained its deference to
the Department of Labor's interpretation of section 3304(a)(12) by not-
ing that "the agency's interpretation of the statute, like its legislative his-
tory, confirms what is clear from the statute's plain language." 466
However, the Fourth Circuit in Brown v. Porcher,467 did not find
that deference to a similar Department of Labor statutory interpretation
was warranted. In Brown, the court had been asked to defer to the De-
partment's view that FUTA section 3304(a)(12) was intended only to
461 It is also interesting to note that UIPL No. 33-75, supra note 75, includes another seem-
ingly "neutral" set of rules which would result in the denial of benefits to a woman who termi-
nates her job on the basis of pregnancy. The list includes laws denying benefits on the basis of
domestic and marital obligations and dependency allowances. Several of the states listed-
California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada, New York, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, and West Virginia, for example-apparently had
statutes that disqualified a claimant if the claimant quit employment for the purpose of mar-
rying or performing some marital, parental, or other family business. For example, the Missis-
sippi statute, as described in the Department of Labor letter, stated that "[m]arital, domestic
and filial circumstances and obligations shall not be deemed good cause and [the] individual
[is] disqualified for benefits until he has earned remuneration of not less than 8 times his
weekly benefit amount." UIPL No. 33-75, supra note 75 (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 71-5-
513(1) (1972)). In Franklin v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 242 Miss. 447, 136 So. 2d 197
(1961) (overruled in Smith v. Employment See. Comm'n, 344 So. 2d 137 (Miss. 1977)), the
Mississippi Supreme Court held that quitting work because of pregnancy is not good cause
because it arises out of marital, filial, and domestic circumstances and obligations, as set out in
the law. Thus, another facially neutral rule would deny unemployment benefits to a woman
who leaves employment due to pregnancy. In its letter, the Department of Labor seemed to
classify all laws which explicitly disqualified individuals on the basis of marital and domestic
obligations as "discriminatory." See Rosettenstein, supra note 50, at 398-99.
462 Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 521.
463 442 U.S. 397 (1979); see text accompanying notes 394-98 supra.
464 439 U.S. at 551 (1979).
465 Davis, 442 U.S. at 411 (citing Teamsters, 439 U.S. at 566 n.20).
466 Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 522.
467 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983); see text accompanying
notes 341-50 supra.
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prohibit discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.468 The court of ap-
peals quoted the Supreme Court for the criteria by which such an inter-
pretation should be weighed, stating that the "amount of deference due
an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute... 'will depend
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its rea-
soning, [and] its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements
... ' "469 Using this test, the Brown court gave little weight to the De-
partment's interpretation, finding "neither authority nor legislative his-
tory" to support the interpretation. 470
This reasoning would have been equally applicable in Wimberly.
Not only is there no legislative history to support the Labor Depart-
ment's interpretation, but one of the letters relied upon by the Wimberly
Court-Program Letter No. 33-75471-shows little evidence of "thor-
oughness" in approach, and is internally inconsistent. The preparation
of the list of "discriminatory" statutes merely seemed to entail a search
for statutes which contained the word "pregnancy." 472 Not only did this
list include statutes, such as that of Oregon, 473 which said virtually the
same thing as the Missouri statute upheld in Wimberly, it also was in-
complete in that it did not include statutes, such as that of Florida, which
expressly mention pregnancy as a disqualifying condition.474 The Letter
was also inconsistent in that it listed as "discriminatory" the relatively
neutral laws of several states in which disqualified individuals left jobs
due to marital or domestic circumstances. 475 In short, the Department
of Labor's interpretations of FUTA section 3304(a)(12) and the state
laws it addresses did not possess enough authority, thoroughness, or con-
sistency to justify the weight accorded them by the Wimberly Court.
One final criticism of the Wimberly Court's reasoning relates to the
statement by the Court that "Missouri does not have a 'policy' specifi-
cally relating to pregnancy .. .- 476 That this is not an entirely accurate
468 This view was expressed in a Department of Labor letter solicited during the Brown
litigation. See text accompanying note 348 supra.
469 Brown, 660 F.2d at 1004-05 (quoting St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South
Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 783 (1981)).
470 Id. at 1005.
471 See note 75 supra.
472 See text accompanying notes 458-60 supra.
473 See Or. Rev. Stat. § 657.155(2) (1976); note 458 supra.
474 See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 443.06(1) (1975) (repealed 1977) (described in General Tel. Co. v.
Board of Review, 356 So. 2d 1357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)). This statute defined "good
cause" for leaving employment as "only such cause as is attributable to the employer or con-
sists of illness or disability of the individual, other than pregnancy." Id.; see note 141 supra.
475 See UIPL No. 33-75, supra note 75.
476 Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 520. This comment was in response to Ms. Wimberly's argument
that Missouri and other states' neutral disqualification statutes had not been included on the
Department of Labor's list because the policies of those states were not apparent from a mere
reading of the statutes themselves. See id. It is important to note that in Brown, the Fourth
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statement becomes apparent when it is studied in light of the Missouri
cases that have examined this issue.477 These cases show a tendency to
interpret the Missouri unemployment law narrowly in cases involving
pregnant or formerly pregnant women.
In Bussman Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Commission,478 for ex-
ample, a Missouri appellate court held that Missouri's disqualification
statute should be "strictly construed" and that there was no basis for
focusing on the "voluntariness" of a pregnant woman's leaving work as a
separate requirement under the statute.479 Other states have taken a
more liberal view and found that leaving employment to have a child is
involuntary.480 In Lauderdale v. Division of Employment Security,481 a
Missouri court found that a woman on a maternity leave remained too
attached to her employer to be "available" for work with other employ-
ers, and thus was ineligible for benefits. Courts of other states applying
similar statutes have allowed a woman on maternity leave, who is avail-
able for lighter work, to receive unemployment benefits when unable to
find such work.4 8 2
In Trail v. Industrial Commission,4 83 a Missouri court found that a
pregnant woman who was not re-employed after her maternity leave was
deemed to be laid off at the time she applied for reinstatement and there-
fore her termination of work was directly attributable to her employer.484
However, this decision conflicted with the court's earlier decision in
Neely v. Division of Employment Security,485 and was later narrowed to
apply only to certain leaves of absence in Division of Employment Secu-
Circuit struck down the state's practice of finding pregnant women ineligible under South Car-
olina's neutrally worded statute. See Brown v. Porcher, 660 F.2d at 1001, 1005 (4th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983). It was argued in the Brief for ACLU that
"[i]ntentional discrimination against pregnant women and new mothers can occur even in
states which do not impose blanket disqualifications." Brief for ACLU, supra note 414, at 25.
The Brief cited cases from New York and Connecticut that indicated that the states had prac-
tices of treating pregnant or formerly pregnant unemployment claimants differently from other
claimants in that they scrutinized these women's claims more meticulously, refused to refer
them for job interviews, and required greater proof of availability than that required of other
claimants. Id. at 25-27 (citing Connecticut NOW v. Peraro, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
31,169 (D. Conn. 1980); Feehan v. Levine, 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,773 (S.D.N.Y.
1976)).
477 See text accompanying notes 219-24, 278-93 supra.
478 355 S.W.2d 456 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960).
479 Id. at 460-61; see text accompanying notes 220-24 supra.
480 See text accompanying notes 209-11, 221-32 supra.
481 605 S.W.2d 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1080); see text accompanying notes 103-09, 290-93
supra.
482 See text accompanying notes 118-30 supra.
483 540 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); see text accompanying notes 278-81 supra.
484 Trail, 540 S.W.2d at 183.
485 379 S.W.2d 201 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); see text accompanying notes 282-83 supra.
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rity v. Labor & Industrial Relations Commission.486 Thus, in virtually
every case involving the rights of unemployed pregnant or formerly preg-
nant women, Missouri has construed its statute to preclude benefits, even
though other states have shown that equally sound reasoning exists for a
more liberal construction. To the degree these judicial constructions
constitute a "policy," it is clear that Missouri has a consistent one aimed
at denying unemployment benefits to pregnant and formerly pregnant
women.
Part II has shown that the result in Wimberly is not as clearly cor-
rect as the Supreme Court would make it appear. Part III examines
some of the broader issues implicated by the Wimberly decision, and ar-
gues that, statutory interpretation aside, it is not wise to deny women
unemployment benefits because of pregnancy.
III
BEYOND WIMBERLY: THE NATIONAL DEBATE ON THE
TREATMENT OF PREGNANT AND FORMERLY
PREGNANT WOMEN IN THE
WORKPLACE
As the above discussion indicates, the treatment of pregnant and
formerly pregnant women under state unemployment laws can vary
widely under statutes which themselves may be virtually identical. For
example, courts have answered the question of whether a woman who
has left work due to pregnancy is eligible for unemployment benefits, that
is, "able and available for work," by using a broad spectrum of theories.
Courts have chosen to interpret a maternity leave as a voluntary with-
drawal from the workplace, indicating that the claimant is not available
for work;487 as an indication that a woman is not serious about seeking
lighter work, because she has chosen to remain attached to her em-
ployer; 488 and as an indication that the woman is not in fact "unem-
ployed," and therefore should not be receiving unemployment benefits. 489
On the other hand, many courts have rejected the conclusion that a
woman on maternity leave is automatically ineligible to receive bene-
fits.490 A pregnant woman's request to perform work of a less strenuous
nature has been interpreted as a sign of availability for work,491 and a
request for a maternity leave has been interpreted as evidence of a
486 617 S.W.2d 620 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); see text accompanying notes 284-88 supra.
487 See text accompanying notes 102-12 supra.
488 See text accompanying notes 103-09 supra.
489 See text accompanying notes 131-57 supra.
490 See text accompanying notes 113-30 supra.
491 Id.
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woman's sincere intent to return to the workplace. 492
The wide range of interpretations is even more evident in the con-
text of disqualification statutes. For example, some courts have inter-
preted leaving to give birth as "voluntary" leaving,493 while others have
seen this type of termination of employment as so compelling and neces-
sary as to be "involuntary. '494 Still other courts, while admitting that a
woman who leaves work to have a child may not be doing so "volunta-
rily," refuse to read the requirement of voluntariness independently of
other statutory requirements, such as the requirement that an applicant
not leave without good cause directly attributable to her employer.495
According to some courts' interpretations, a woman who takes a mater-
nity leave terminates her employment at the time she takes the leave,
making her termination "due to pregnancy" and thus disqualifying her
for unemployment benefits.4 96 For other courts, the actual termination
does not occur until the woman returns to work after childbirth and is
denied job reinstatement. 497 At that point, the woman is deemed to have
been laid off and, consequently, because her termination was attributable
to her employer, she is qualified to receive benefits. Some states have
specifically included pregnancy as "good cause" for leaving employ-
ment498 while other states have, through judicial interpretations, deter-
mined that pregnancy is not good cause.499 Some courts have concluded
that a woman who did not ask for a leave of absence prior to having her
child has abandoned her position in the workforce, and is thus not quali-
fied to receive unemployment compensation. 5° Some courts have miti-
gated the requirement that a woman leave "with good cause attributable
to her employer" by including circumstances in which the work aggra-
vated the physical condition rather than caused it.501 In each of these
cases, it is clear that the court could have made the decision either to
award or to deny unemployment benefits with support both in logic, and
to some degree, precedent.
Similarly, it is apparent that in Wimberly v. Labor & Industrial Re-
492 See text accompanying notes 143-44 supra.
493 See text accompanying notes 230-32 supra.
494 See text accompanying notes 199-211.
495 See text accompanying notes 220-24 supra.
496 See text accompanying notes 244-50 supra.
497 See text accompanying notes 270-81 supra.
498 See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1106(a) (1985); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 61-6-3
(1978); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-7-303(a)(1) (Supp. 1986).
499 See text accompanying notes 190-92 supra.
500 See text accompanying notes 251-65 supra. In none of these states is a person who
leaves employment due to an illness other than pregnancy required to prove that he or she is in
fact not abandoning the workforce.
501 See text accompanying notes 233-35 supra.
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lations Commission 502 the Supreme Court could have logically, and with
ample precedent, decided the case either in favor of or against the claim-
ant. The Court based its decision to affirm the denial of benefits on the
theory that the term "solely on the basis of pregnancy" was a term de-
manding nondiscrimination, but not mandating preferential treatment.50 3
This theory was based on the sparse legislative history of FUTA section
3304(a)(12), on sporadic interpretations of that section by the Depart-
ment of Labor, and on earlier decisions of the Supreme Court interpret-
ing similarly worded statutes.5 4 As has been noted, the legislative
history of FUTA lends itself to both arguments,505 the interpretations by
the Department of Labor tend to be internally inconsistent, lacking in
thoroughness, and devoid of authority, 5 6 and previous decisions of the
Supreme Court dealing specifically with unemployment compensation
and religious beliefs used the term "solely on the basis of" to indicate
special accommodation rather than nondiscriminatory treatment.50 7
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Wimberly re-
flects some of the reasoning of another pregnancy-related decision
reached by the Court a week earlier. In California Federal Savings and
Loan Association v. Guerra,508 the Supreme Court upheld a California
statute which required that a pregnant employee be given up to four
months unpaid maternity leave with a reinstatement guarantee upon her
return to work. Opponents of the statute claimed that it was pre-empted
by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,509 since the state statute
mandated preferential treatment for female employees, and Title VII re-
quires equal treatment.510 While agreeing that the California statute con-
templated special treatment of pregnant women, the Court noted that
Congress intended Title VII, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act,511 "to be 'a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits
may not drop-not a ceiling above which they may not rise.' "512
Although the practical effect of the Court's decision in California Federal
was the protection of a state-imposed right for pregnant women, the
Court's interpretation of Title VII made it clear that federal law required
502 479 U.S. 511 (1987).
503 Id. at 522.
504 Id. at 517-22.
505 See text accompanying notes 71-74 supra.
506 See text accompanying notes 457-75 supra.
507 See text accompanying notes 449-50 supra.
$08 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
509 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
510 California Federal, 479 U.S. at 284.
511 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
512 479 U.S. at 285 (quoting California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390,
396 (9th Cir. 1985)).
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only that women not be discriminated against due to pregnancy.51 3 Simi-
larly, the Wimberly Court concluded that FUTA section 3304(a)(12) re-
quired only that pregnant women be treated equally-it did not mandate
special treatment for them. In light of these two decisions, it is logical to
assume that if the state of Missouri had decided to exempt pregnant and
formerly pregnant women from the "good cause attributable to the em-
ployer" requirement, the Supreme Court would have upheld this prefer-
ential treatment. However, neither FUTA section 3304(a)(12) nor Title
VII would be held to mandate such an exemption.
The Wimberly and California Federal cases cast a light on what has
become a national debate on the treatment of pregnant women in the
workplace. The debate extends far beyond the question of whether preg-
nancy can be used as a blanket disqualification for benefits or as a ground
for firing an individual. The combination of Cleveland Board of Educa-
tion v. LaFleur,514 Turner v. Department of Employment Security,515 and
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, among others, indicate that the mere
condition of pregnancy cannot be used as an excuse for treating pregnant
women less favorably than men or nonpregnant women.516 These cases
and the statute reject the traditional "negative" view of the role of
women in our society. For religious, social, or biological reasons, the
proponents of this negative (sometimes referred to as "protective") treat-
ment agree with Justice Bradley's classic statement that the roles of
women in society are the "noble and benign offices of wife and
mother." 517
The voices of these proponents can still be heard in the decisions of
those courts which hold that women who have babies are not genuinely
513 See id. at 286.
514 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
515 423 U.S. 44 (1975).
516 For a discussion of these and other factors that have led to the demise of blanket dis-
qualifications and firings based on pregnancy, see Dowd, Maternity Leave: Taking Sex Differ-
ences into Account, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 699, 705-09 (1986); Williams, supra note 167, at 333-
51.
517 Bradwell v. The State, 83 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). Justice
Bradley noted:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the
respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's
protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to
the female sex evidently unfit it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitu-
tion of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in
the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which will properly belong to
the domain and functions of womanhood ....
... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign
offices of wife and mother. This is law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society
must be adapted to the general constitution of things ....
Id.
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attached to the workforce, and therefore are not eligible to receive unem-
ployment benefits. Recent statistics, however, indicate that women with
children are a major component of the current American workforce.
Approximately forty-five percent of the American workforce is female.518
Many of these women are also mothers. In what has been termed "the
most significant labor force development the country experienced" in the
period from 1950 to 1981, the participation rate in the workforce of
women with children under age eighteen more than tripled, rising from
18.4% in 1950 to 58.1% in 1981.519 Additionally, statistics show that at
least sixty-five percent of American women in their child-bearing years
are currently members of the workforce. 5 20 In light of these facts,
whether or not they "belong" there, women have become genuinely at-
tached to the workforce.
Among those who think that women are, in fact, a viable compo-
nent of the American workforce, a more sophisticated and complex de-
bate is taking place on the question of how pregnant women and new
mothers should be treated. This debate has been referred to as "the equal
treatment/special treatment debate" since the main question is whether
pregnancy should be treated in the same manner as other disabilities, or
as a unique physical condition.5 21 The proposed answers to that question
are complex, but in all cases, the goal is to achieve complete participation
in the workplace by women.5 22 This Part will not attempt to refine or
embellish this debate but will discuss the Wimberly case within its con-
text. In addition, this discussion will focus primarily upon the debate as
518 United States Dep't of Labor, Employment and Earnings 18 (Dec. 9, 1986) (statistics as
of Nov. 1986).
519 United States Dep't of Labor, Bull. No. 298, Time of Change: 1983 Handbook on
Women Workers 17, 20.
520 Id. at 7.
521 It is difficult to pinpoint the origin of the terminology "equal treatment/special treat-
ment." Commentators such as Ronald Dworkin have long focused on the question of whether
the concept of equality refers to the right to equal treatment or the right to treatment which
results in equality of effect. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 223-39 (1978). Professor
Ann Scales included these dual visions of equality in her identification of the various models of
equality which have emerged in feminist jurisprudence. See generally, Scales, Towards a Fem-
inist Jurisprudence, 56 Ind. L.J. 375 (1980-81) (arguing for further examination and applica-
tion of feminist jurisprudence). As discussed at note 523 infra, the two concepts of sexual
equality have led to a number of variant subspecies and related categories.
522 Among the many outstanding studies published in the area are the following: S. Hewlett,
A Lesser Life (1986); S. Kamerman, A. Kahn & P. Kingston, Maternity Policies and Working
Women (1983); Dowd, supra note 516; Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and The
Supreme Court, 92 Yale L.J. 913 (1983); Kay, supra note 327; Krieger & Cooney, The Miller-
Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality,
13 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 513 (1983); Law, supra note 306; Olsen, The Family and the Mar-
ket: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497 (1983); Scales, supra note
521; Williams, supra note 167; Note, Toward a Redefinition of Sexual Equality, 95 Harv. L.
Rev. 487 (1981).
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it relates to pregnancy and childbirth on the assumption that, while only
women are physically able to bear children, the role of child-rearing is
not dependent upon gender.523
Proponents of the equal treatment approach base their legal theories
on two propositions. The first proposition is that "sex-based generaliza-
tions are generally impermissible whether derived from physical differ-
ences such as size and strength, from cultural role assignments such as
breadwinner or homemaker, or from some combination of innate and
ascribed characteristics, such as the greater longevity of the average
woman compared to the average man. ' 524 The second proposition is
that statutes which are ostensibly "neutral," in that they do not expressly
classify on the basis of sex, may still have a disproportionate negative
impact upon one gender.525 In such a case, the burden of justification
should be placed on the party defending the statute. 526 The attitude con-
templated by advocates of the equal treatment approach is that, in the
workforce, pregnancy should be treated in the same manner as any other
physical disability. 527 This attitude is based upon the fundamental the-
ory that an androgynous rather than a male prototype should be the
model for the workplace. 528 The dangers seen by equal treatment advo-
523 The separation between child-bearing and child-rearing may not be acceptable to some
proponents of the special treatment argument. Proponents of the equal treatment argument
insist upon separating childbirth and child-rearing in an attempt to undermine stereotypes
about women's traditional roles as wife and mother. See Williams, supra note 167, at 354-55.
On the other hand, for some proponents of the special treatment argument, it is important that
the workforce recognize that women in our society remain the primary child-rearers and, con-
sequently, that special treatment may be needed to accommodate women in this role, particu-
larly in the months immediately following childbirth. See S. Hewlett, supra note 522, at 177-
96. In this regard, the author's position perhaps most accurately reflects the theory of "epi-
sodic analysis" developed by Professor Herma Hill Kay, which confines special treatment to
those limited periods of time when the physical needs of pregnant women may be greater than
the needs of men-"during the episode of pregnancy itself." Kay, supra note 327, at 32-37.
Professor Kay views this episodic analysis "as a basis for harmonizing some of the views of the
opposing participants in the so-called 'equal treatment/special treatment' debate." Id. at 32-
33.
524 Williams, supra note 167, at 329.
525 Id. at 330.
526 Id.
527 See id. at 355-56.
528 See id. at 369. Two bills treating parents in a gender-neutral manner have been intro-
duced in the United States Congress. See H.R. 925, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987); S. 249,
100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987). These bills provide for parental leaves to be used by either
parent upon the birth or adoption of a child or upon a serious health condition of a dependent
child or parent. H.R. 925, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 103, 201 (1987); S. 249, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. §§ 103, 201 (1987).
It should be noted that, although equal treatment proponents assert that their focus is an
androgynous rather than male prototype in the workplace, proponents of the special treatment
approach have criticized equal treatment advocates for taking exactly the opposite approach.
Professor Nancy Dowd, for example, says of the equal treatment approach: "[I]t appears to
assume that the level of equal treatment required is defined by the treatment of males. In other
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cates in a special treatment approach to pregnancy are: (a) the return of
protectionist legislation that resulted in the removal of pregnant women
from the workplace; 529 and (b) the increased possibility that women will
become less desirable employees because of the special accommodations
due pregnancy in the workplace.530
Advocates of the special treatment approach argue that real biologi-
cal differences between men and women cannot be ignored if women are
ever to achieve equality in the workplace. The focus of this argument is
not on the actual treatment of men and women, but rather on the desired
result of equality in today's workplace. In pursuit of this result, it is not
only permissible, but at times preferable, to have policies that favor one
gender over the other.531 Under some versions of this theory, the "real"
differences between men and women which should be considered include
certain psychological as well as physiological traits, such as those tradi-
tionally "female" assets of nurturing and caring. Under this theory, the
workplace should be structured to ease the dual burden that women bear
as members of the workforce and as the primary child-rearers.5 32
Other proponents of this view advocate a much narrower focus for
special accommodations. Their theory, which has also been character-
ized as an alternative to the equal treatment and special treatment theo-
ries,533 envisions an approach which calls for special accommodation for
women only in those situations in which the actual reproductive function
is involved.5 34 Under this approach, pregnant women are not compared
with disabled persons, but with men who also have exercised their repro-
ductive capacities. 535 Laws and employment programs promulgated in
accordance with this view would enable a woman to enter and compete
words, discrimination is defined by the existing structure of employee benefits, which are prem-
ised on a male model." Dowd, supra note 516, at 719.
529 For a discussion of this protectionist legislation, see Williams, supra note 167, at 333-35.
Professor Williams also views the judicial results in the pre-Pregnancy Discrimination Act
pregnancy cases as indicative of the types of decisions that a special treatment approach may
command. She points out that in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), and
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), see notes 306, 327, 426 supra, the Court treated as
unique and "extra" the reproductive function of women. See Williams, supra note 167, at 343.
In LaFleur, according to Williams, the result was positive, resulting in the striking down of a
blanket exclusion of women from the workplace during their pregnancies. But in Geduldig,
and again in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), see note 426 supra, the
characterization of pregnancy as a unique and special condition foreclosed the argument that
women workers were entitled to the same coverage for this debilitating condition as were their
male counterparts for other disabilities. See Williams, supra note 167, at 341-44.
530 See Williams, supra note 167, at 367.
531 Dowd, supra note 516, at 719-20.
532 S. Hewlett, supra note 522, at 142-44.
533 Kay, supra note 327, at 22; Law, supra note 306, at 969.
534 Kay, supra note 327, at 22.
535 Id. at 31.
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in the workforce "without fear of encountering obstacles to her decision
to bear a child. '536
The maternity leave statute examined in the California Federal case
became a focal point for the equal treatment/special treatment debate.
For equal treatment advocates, such mandated maternity leaves exempli-
fied the type of accommodation that could foster a reluctance on the part
of employers to hire women workers.5 37 The remedy under the equal
treatment theory would be to expand the mandate for childbirth and
adoption related leaves to include leaves for parents of both genders.5 38
For proponents of the special treatment approach and the episodic
analysis approach, mandated maternity leave is a "legally valid means to
restructure the workplace.1 539 These commentators find that the ab-
sence of maternity leave policies "has a devastating impact on women's
employment opportunities by continuing to impose serious employment
detriments on the basis of pregnancy, as well as reinforcing the primary
parenting role of women. 5'540
From this discussion it should be obvious that the Wimberly Court's
approach to FUTA section 3304(a)(12) reflects an adherence to the equal
treatment philosophy. Under the Missouri statute, a woman who leaves
work due to pregnancy is treated in the same manner as any individual
who leaves work due to a temporary disability that is not caused by the
employer. However, if the analyses of Sherbert v. Verner 541 and Thomas
v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division54 2 were fol-
lowed, an interpretation of the term "solely on the basis of pregnancy"
would have reflected a special treatment approach to pregnancy.
Under the special treatment approach, a woman who leaves work
536 Id. at 36.
537 See Williams, supra note 167, at 370-74 (discussing a similar Montana statute inter-
preted in Miller-Wohl Co. v. Commissioner of Labor & Indus., 515 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Mont.
1981), vacated, 685 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1982).
538 See note 528 supra (discussing proposed bills mandating family leave). In this regard,
equal treatment advocates do not dispute that the proper policies for today's workplace and
proper workplace policies for the ideal world may not always be the same. Professor Wendy
Williams has stated:
There is one sense in which I feel the attraction of "special treatment." Visions of
equality are one thing; ability to realize a particular vision at a particular historical
moment and place is another. It has always been easier to wrench from the jaws of the
political system special provisions for women in the name of motherhood rather than
general provisions aimed at the realignment of sex roles in the family and restructuring
of the workplace. Urgent problems cry out for immediate solutions. Half the proverbial
loaf (provisions like Montana's or California's) sometimes seem better than none.
Williams, supra note 167, at 380.
539 Dowd, supra note 516, at 700.
540 Id. at 715.
541 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see notes 436-50 and accompanying text supra.
542 450 U.S. 707 (1981); see text accompanying notes 440-50 supra.
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due to pregnancy would not be disqualified from receiving unemploy-
ment benefits, because of the special accommodation of pregnancy
authorized by FUTA section 3304(a)(12). Applying the criticism set
forth by Professor Wendy Williams, it is clear that a special treatment
interpretation of FUTA section 3304(a)(12) could entail a number of the
costs feared by equal treatment advocates.5 43 First, due to the experi-
ence-rating methods used to calculate employer contributions to the un-
employment system, 54 it is possible that women who are likely to
become pregnant will become less desirable employees, and suffer dis-
crimination during the initial hiring process.5 5  Second, the special
treatment of pregnancy in the unemployment compensation context
might shift attention from the fact that, in Missouri and other states,
disabled employees are subject to a complete loss of income if their dis-
ability is not directly attributable to the employer.5 " In other words, if
the statutes are judicially changed as to pregnant employees, their injus-
tice towards all employees might go unremedied. Finally, it is possible
that a special treatment interpretation of FUTA section 3304(a)(12)
could perpetuate the stereotype of women as bearing a special reproduc-
tive and child-rearing role.5 47 By thus making women the target of spe-
cial protection, their ability to compete in the workplace may be
hampered.548
On the other hand, a practical analysis of the effects of the Missouri
unemployment compensation law upheld in Wimberly demonstrates the
adverse consequences for a worker who becomes pregnant. Obviously, it
is physiologically necessary for a woman to take some time off from work
in order to bear her child. Missouri, however, has no law which man-
dates that an employer grant a pregnant woman a leave of absence with a
job reinstatement guarantee. Furthermore, when she is physically able to
resume working, she is disqualified from receiving unemployment com-
pensation if her former job is unavailable and she is not able to find an-
other position.
Under the Missouri law, the same predicament would face an em-
ployee who, for example, broke his leg in a skiing accident. That em-
ployee may be required to take some time off if he has to remain in a
hospital. If reinstatement is not guaranteed after this leave and the em-
ployee is unable to find employment with his former or with some other
employer when he becomes physically able to work again, he too would
543 See Williams, supra note 167, at 371.
5" See text accompanying note 35 supra.
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be denied unemployment compensation.
However, a subtle but very real difference exists between the fate of
the pregnant worker and the fate of the worker who was injured in an
accident. The latter worker did not have to make a "choice" between
having a job and being physically disabled. For him, the disability was
purely an "accident. ' 549 The woman who is pregnant, on the other
hand, has in many cases "chosen" her fate in choosing to bear a child,
and incurring the accompanying loss of income. Herein lie questions of
major importance in the application of unemployment laws: to what de-
gree do we as a society force women to make this unpleasant choice be-
tween bearing children and maintaining a steady stream of income, and
to what degree is this notion of "choice" actually illusory.
In other words, by denying pregnant and formerly pregnant women
unemployment benefits, society at best forces a difficult choice. Further-
more, while the decision to have a child remains the choice of each sexu-
ally active female, the "decision" to propagate the species is not a
voluntary one for women.550 Only women can bear children. Forcing
working women out of their jobs by providing no guarantee of job rein-
statement, and then denying them a source of replacement income when
they engage in an activity of primary importance to the continued exis-
tence of our species would perhaps do more to hamper the participation
of women in the workplace than any legislation which made accommo-
dations for pregnancy. The forced loss of income that occurs in a state
which lacks mandatory reinstatement after maternity leave and denies
unemployment compensation to those women who are not reinstated,
will indeed result in a lack of genuine attachment to the workplace for
women who choose to bear children. Additionally, it will perpetuate the
already unequal economic condition of women. The vision of a work-
place in which men and women are both treated equally and perceived as
equal contributors is idyllic, but unrealistic. Until the workplace is struc-
tured to accommodate all working parents, the special treatment of preg-
nant women in the context of the unemployment compensation laws
seems necessary to prevent the devastating effects of forcing women to
choose between having income and having children.
549 Of course, this employee was not required to go skiing and therefore in some sense
contributed to his own fate. However, for that matter, the employee could just as easily have
been injured in an automobile accident while crossing the street in his neighborhood. At one
extreme, we are all "responsible" for our fates in the sense that we make conscious choices,
such as the choice to cross the street, that lead to the ensuing results. Without attempting a
philosophical discourse on the concepts of "accident" as opposed to "responsibility," this au-
thor will assume that some results occur that an individual would not have chosen had he
foreseen the consequence of his actions.
550 See Williams, supra note 167, at 354 n.114.




Conclusions in this area are not easily reached. The foregoing sum-
mary of the various interpretations and treatments of pregnancy under
state unemployment compensation laws indicates that pregnancy can be
accommodated within these laws. As the discussion shows, courts in
many states have found pregnant and formerly pregnant women to be
both eligible for the receipt of unemployment compensation and not to be
disqualified from these benefits. 551 However, the United States Supreme
Court in Wimberly chose not to require this type of interpretation. It
saw its choice as one between equal, nondiscriminatory treatment, and
special, unique accommodations for pregnant women. It found the Mis-
souri approach to pregnancy in the unemployment context to be a valid,
nondiscriminatory approach. Within the confines of the question of law
presented, it perhaps could have done no more without mandating a spe-
cial treatment interpretation of FUTA section 3304(a)(12). The fact re-
mains, however, that the Court's decision forces women in that state, and
any other state which follows the same interpretation, to run the risk of
forfeiting their income when they decide to bear a child.
Enactment of the proposed family leave acts, 552 which would force
employers to offer parental leave with job reinstatement guarantees to all
employees, would potentially resolve the disqualification question.55 3
However, this solution bears both tangible and intangible costs of its
own. 554 Meanwhile, continued application of the equal treatment ap-
551 See text accompanying notes 77-302 supra.
552 See note 528 supra.
553 The problem of disqualification from the receipt of unemployment benefits arises when a
woman who has had a child finds her former position, or a comparable position, unavailable
when she is ready to return to work. She is then denied unemployment compensation because
she left work due to pregnancy. Under the proposed family leave acts, she would be guaran-
teed job reinstatement upon her return to work and therefore would not need unemployment
compensation. See H.R. 925, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 103, 201 (1987); S. 249, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. §§ 103, 201 (1987). However, the fact that she is on a leave of absence may affect her
eligibility for benefits if she wishes to perform, but is unable to find, lighter work. In this
circumstance, some courts have chosen to interpret the leave of absence as a limitation on her
availability for work, thus rendering her ineligible for unemployment benefits. See text accom-
panying notes 103-12, 289-293 supra.
554 The United States Chamber of Commerce has released what it characterizes as a "con-
servative estimate" of $16.2 billion as the increased costs employers would face upon the enact-
ment of the family leave acts. F. Shane, Statement of the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States on S. 249, The Parental and Medical Leave Act of 1987, at 8 (Feb. 19, 1987) (on file at
New York University Law Review). These figures would include the cost of temporarily re-
placing an employee who was on leave, the operational cost of using an inexperienced worker
in the employee's position, and the cost of employing an additional 1,000 federal workers to
oversee enforcement of the new law. Id. The Chamber of Commerce also performed a "micro
level cost assessment" of the costs involved in giving one typical worker four and a half months
of unpaid parental leave. The study used the amount of $6,882.65 for the 4.5 months of the
leave as the base pay plus costs directly linked to the employee, such as Social Security and
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proach in the case of unemployment benefits will result in devastating
effects for many women in Missouri and other states that interpret their
laws similarly. Therefore, the practical cost to women of denying special
treatment at this point in time may well outweigh the benefits of treating
pregnant women like other disabled workers. 555
workers' compensation. Id. at 10. When this amount was subtracted from the estimated sal-
ary of a trained replacement ($11,936.87) and the cost of continuing benefits to the employee
on leave ($666.76), the study showed that the unpaid leave would cost the employer $5,722.98.
Id. The cost of replacing an employee who was on paid leave was estimated at $12,605.63. Id.
The figures in this study were somewhat high as they were based on Washington D.C. salaries.
Id. A seven city survey by the Chamber showed that the average cost to the employer of 18
weeks of unpaid leave would be $2,050.42 and the average cost of the same amount of paid
leave would be $9,018.63. Id. at 11. In analyzing this data it must not be forgotten that
several companies are already offering some form of maternity leave and thus the costs pro-
jected in this study have to some extent already been incurred. It must also be noted that even
if the family leave bills are enacted the majority of parental leaves will probably still be taken
by women rather than by men. Recent surveys of employer attitudes toward parental leave
indicate that while over 65% of employers deem parental leave as "reasonable" for women, the
majority feel that such leave is "unreasonable" for men. See M. Radford, supra note 358, at
29-30. Some employers even express open hostility to the concept of parental leave for fathers.
See id. at 26-27.
555 An interesting cost assessment in the unemployment context was pointed out by Justice
Marshall in his dissenting opinion in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63
(1976); see text accompanying notes 430-32 supra. The Supreme Court held in that case that
an employer is not required to provide preferential treatment to an employee whose religious
convictions prevent her from working on certain days. Observing that many employees would
possibly be unable to find or retain work as a result of the decision, Justice Marshall noted that
the societal costs of supporting these people on welfare could well exceed the cost of requiring
employers to make special accommodations. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 97 n.14 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). In the case of employees such as Ms. Wimberly, the result of new mothers being
denied unemployment compensation could be to force many of these women on welfare. This
result would save the government little or no money and would serve to perpetuate the inferior
financial status of women in our society.
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